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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to compile, analyze and present information on the current
Egyptian government’s approaches for dealing with slums to enable the assessment of their
success and sustainability. Those approaches are basically eviction, demolition and relocation
(80% of the interventions), in situ development (20% of the interventions) and community
participation. In addition, the thesis researches international experiences from the developing
world, tackling in situ and relocation approaches. The cases were selected in order to come up
with their success factors and shed light on their applicability to the Egyptian context. A case
study using qualitative analysis demonstrates a typical example of the relocation approach
adopted by the Egyptian government; that is Osman Housing (Masaken Osman) in Sixth of
October City. In-depth interviews were conducted with the relocated residents from Deweka area
to find out whether the government’s intervention solved their housing problem or not. The
findings show that the Egyptian government’s relocation approach concentrated more on trying
to eradicate existing slums rather than addressing the socio-economic drives that led to the
growth of informal areas including urban poverty. This approach resulted in making the poor
even poorer and slum dwellers even more marginalized. The thesis concludes with a set of
recommendations based on the learned lessons and success factors of the international
experiences introduced in the study, the literature review, and the realities and findings reflected
in field work of the case study. These recommendations highlight the need for political and
institutional support for intervention programs, promoting community participation and adopting
a rights-based approach that recognizes that residents of slum areas have the same rights as other
citizens in formal areas.
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Chapter One: Introduction
Dealing with slums, or informal areas in general, is one of the major national urban
challenges in Egypt. Slums as well as other informal areas are usually defined and categorized as
per their physical conditions and legal position. They are divided into two categories, those of
good conditions and others with deteriorated conditions. Areas that are classified as unplanned
but at the same time of good conditions constitute 85-90% of informal areas while areas
classified as slum with deteriorated living conditions constitute 10-15% of informal areas (ISDF,
2008). During and after the 1970s, Egypt witnessed rural migrations to cities by the poor who
sought better living conditions. They resorted to poor housing types that included dilapidated
areas in old parts of the city including graveyards and shacks. Formal slums and squatter slums
may necessitate different intervention strategies. On the one hand, deteriorated formal slums
need special attention considering the fact that most deteriorated popular quarters are of urban
value either historically or architecturally, therefore necessitate some rehabilitation. On the other
hand, in unplanned areas the networks of residents provide jobs, services and infrastructure to the
dwellers. Besides, slums differ in the ability of their residents to provide such amenities. This is
normally compensated for by resorting to nearby public services. Slums are considered a threat
to its own dwellers in terms of housing and living conditions. This is evident in the criteria set by
the Informal Settlements Development Facility (ISDF) for unsafe areas (Abdelhalim, 2014). The
ISDF is a fund that was established according to the Presidential Decree # 305/2008 after the fall
of the Duwaika rock which resulted in the death of around 110 people living at the base of the
Mukattam Mountain. The main goal of ISDF is ensuring safe housing and enhancing the quality
of life of the inhabitants in unsafe areas in Egypt (Pieterse, 2011).
ISDF classified unsafe areas to four types in accordance to the degree of risk: first
category includes buildings in locations threatening human life, such as areas in danger of rock
slides, train accidents or flooding; second category is given to deteriorated buildings of low

P a g e |6

resistance to natural disasters; third category is for threats on inhabitants’ health as a result of
lack of clean water, proper sewerage, etc.; fourth category is for threats to the inhabitants’
stability in terms of lack of ownership or the lack of freedom in dealing with the inhabitants
properties. Any delay in solving this issue will result in intensifying the problem. In addition to
the threats to dwellers of existing slums, without serious actions by the Egyptian government
together with civil society, the number of slum dwellers is expected to increase in Egypt, given
also the worsening livelihood conditions of Egyptians due to the slow economic recovery since
2011 (Abdelhalim, 2010).
The challenge of slums is not only limited to Egypt, but it also involves most of the
developing countries. It is therefore considered as a global phenomenon. For several decades in
developing countries, many attempts have been made in the pursuit of solving the dilemma of the
constant growth of informal and slum settlements; many of these attempts have relatively
succeeded, but unfortunately, others are still struggling towards finding a solution (Pieterse,
2011). This thesis follows the rationale of learning from other countries’ successful experiences
in dealing with slums through identifying their success factors and then correlate them to the
Egyptian context. This linking and peer-learning is very conscious of the need to consider the
particular conditions of the receiving country and not to blindly recommend what worked in one
country to another country.
Almost thirty two per cent of the world’s urban population (about 1 billion people) lives
in informal areas, especially slums, and the greater part of them in the developing world (UNHabitat, 2003). Besides, ‘urbanization of poverty’ or the fact that poverty is moving to cities with
no tangible actions taken by governments is blazing the trail to a massive increase in the number
of slum dwellers worldwide (Arnott, 2009).
Figure 1 illustrates socio economic inequality as one of the root causes of the growth of
slums. Poverty, income inequality together with insufficiency in the housing provision system
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result in slum formation. Besides, rural-urban migration where rural areas residents, with
deprived living conditions and low income move to urban areas seeking a better quality of life,
but at the same time contributing to the city’s informality. (UN-Habitat, 2003).

Lack of economic growth

Inequality of income

Residents of rural areas
migration

Insufficiency in
affordable housing
provision

Poverty

Formation of Slums and
Informal Settlements
Figure 1: Formation of Slums
Adapted from United Nations Human Settlements Program, 2003, Pg 17

In this sense, there is a compelling need for more comprehensive studies of the
government’s interventions in this respect and at the same time to look into the practices of
different cities and towns that managed to find viable solutions to the challenge of slums for the
sake of benefiting from learned lessons. Therefore, this thesis aims to compile, analyze and
present information on a number of the current Egyptian government’s approaches towards
dealing with slums to assess their success and sustainability. Meanwhile, international
experiences, particularly in the developing world, will also be demonstrated and analyzed in
order to come up with their success factors or elements of success. The research then aims to
shed light on the applicability of these success factors to the Egyptian government’s intervention
strategies for facing the existing problem of slums.
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The purpose of this paper is to stimulate policy reforms as well as tangible endeavors,
real actions and initiatives for confronting the slums challenge in Egypt. Concrete examples of
international experiences will provide elements and factors of success in dealing with slums,
which in turn will pave the way for suggesting a set of long term and short term measures to be
implemented by the Egyptian government in cooperation with civil society and other
stakeholders.
Statement of Purpose
Existence of slums and the downgraded living conditions they offer are a sign of the
failure of the Egyptian government in dealing with this challenge and its root causes. The
Egyptian government has established the Informal Settlements Development Facility (ISDF) in
2008 to deal with slums. The ISDF replaced the terms “slums,” and “informal settlements,” to
two other names: “unsafe” and “unplanned” areas, following the new unified Building Law (Law
119/2008) which provided these new categories (ISDF, 2012). ISDF was established in order to
ensure safe housing, and provide funding as well as technical assistance to local government to
carry out slum development projects. However, the government interventions in dealing with
slums remained short of being successful in relation to the scale of the phenomenon as well as
the sustainability of the solutions. The real problem is that the Egyptian government deals with
the issue of slums on the basis of its housing safety. Whereas, a holistic approach tackling
poverty, labor skills as well as social capital and other livelihood factors should be adopted for
the sake of improving the livelihood of slum dwellers (Abdelhalim, 2014).
Considering the above, concrete interventions and setting up new policies and strategies
for improving the current condition of slums and the livelihood of their inhabitants is crucial.
The Egyptian government needs to learn from the success of international experiences in dealing
with slums in other parts of the world. In this respect, the research will flag this need and will fill
a gap in knowledge by providing ready-to-use principles and measures based on the analysis of
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international experiences in dealing with slums. In parallel, there is a compelling need for
studying the different intervention strategies which the Egyptian government usually offers for
facing the existing problem of informal settlements. Those solutions are basically slum eviction,
demolition and relocation, which represents around 80% of interventions, in situ slum upgrading,
which represents 20% of interventions and participatory upgrading, which is applied to informal
settlements.
Therefore, a field study was conducted on Osman Housing, as a typical case of
relocation, considering that it is the most common approach adopted by the Egyptian
government. In addition, the thesis presents cases of in situ upgrading both on the local and
international levels as well as a case of relocation on the international level to cover the other
approach in Egypt and globally, which allows for comparability. The public housing project was
offered to the dwellers of some slum areas following the collapse of a rockslide in Manshiet
Nasser in 2008 and resulted in the deaths of 119 or more citizens (Tadamun, 2015). This will
help recognize whether there are lessons to be drawn from such experiences for scaling up and
replication or vice versa and that we should propose new policies and implementation measures
to be adopted by the Egyptian government for better performances. The research will examine
the sufficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of government efforts in dealing with the
challenge of slums in Egypt, especially Cairo, and how Egypt can benefit from other global
successful experiences. This may lead, if taken up, to changing Egypt’s position on the world
map of dealing with slums.
Research Question
A number of efforts exerted by the Egyptian government have not yet achieved complete
success in eliminating the slums phenomenon (Abdelhalim, 2014). Such efforts are mainly
embodied in the role of ISDF which is the official authority that is responsible for planning,
financing and monitoring slums redevelopment projects. Given the remaining number of slums,
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the progress of ISDF in redeveloping them and the scale of the phenomenon, that is expected to
increase with the recent economic challenges, the efforts that have been done so far are not
enough. The Osman Housing case will shed light on whether the efforts already exerted are
effective and sustainable enough or not. The question here is whether we have looked deep
enough into global practices on dealing with slums to learn from them or not. The answer is
obviously that there are still many knowledge gaps to be filled.
Accordingly, this study attempts to present some global experiences in order to solve one
of Egypt’s most pressing problems: slums. In order to do this, this thesis is trying to answer the
question where is Egypt within the global experience of dealing with slums? This will require
answering the following questions:
o What is the current state of slums in Egypt?
o What is the current Egyptian government approach/strategy for dealing with
slums, and what is its effectiveness and success?
o How does Egypt’s current position vis-à-vis slums compare to other global
practices?
o What are the international experiences’ factors of success?
o How applicable are these success factors in Egypt?
o What could be learned to enhance the current policies and implementation
measures towards declaring Cairo as “a city free from slums”?
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Chapter Two: Conceptual Framework and Methodology
Spatial
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their Residents in Egypt

Egyptian Government Strategy & Efforts
for Dealing with Slums
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Figure 2: Conceptual Framework
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Egyptian Government Strategy and Efforts for Dealing with Slums
At first, ignoring informal areas was the normal attitude by the Egyptian government
towards slums and informal settlements until adopting a policy of eradicating them. In the 1980s,
the government started developing strategies to halt their growth (Abdelhalim, 2014).
Developing new cities on desert land is considered an alternative for the growth of informal
settlements on agricultural land. In addition, the local government’s approach towards slums
continued to be demolition and relocation. In 1993, a national program was launched for
redeveloping 20 slum areas. In its second phase, this national program conducted a survey for
identifying the informal areas which require upgrading and those requiring complete
demolishing. Moreover, it was announced in many cases that there was a necessity for tearing
down slums which required forcibly removing residents to remote new cities lacking essential
services. In such cases, residents were forced to make a new life other than their normal sources
lives. Therefore, residents of such areas have always resisted these plans (Madbouly, 2009).
The Egyptian government is trying to adopt two types of approaches in dealing with
informal areas. The first approach is preventative by which measures are taken to limit or stop
the growth of informal settlements. The second approach is the interventionist one where the
government intervenes to improve or remove informal areas (Sims, 2008).

Preventive approaches
Preventative approaches include the following:
Belting program: a planning technique formalized by the government to halt the
outward expansion of informal areas by surrounding them with planned areas (Tadamun, 2014).
This program was implemented from 2004 to 2008 as a part of a huge informal settlements
upgrading program. The program included two stages, the first stage was from 1994–2004 and
basically aimed at providing basic services and infrastructure such as provision of water,
electricity, sanitary, landscaping, street paving, greening as well as developing deteriorated areas.
P a g e | 13

The second stage, from 2004–2008, included the informal settlement belting program. This stage
concentrated on setting detailed plans that would limit the expansion of informal settlements.
When the program was concluded, only basic urban services of electricity, water, sanitary
drainage, municipal cleanliness and road paving were provided for about 352 informal areas. No
real belting was actually implemented (Khalifa, 2011).
Urban growth boundaries (UGB): a planning means used to define limits for urban
growth within a span of 20 years (Nada, 2014). Within the Egyptian context, this planning tool
aims at restricting the development of informal settlements on agricultural land. This is done as
an integral part of setting the strategic plan of the city and it specifies new areas to be added to
the city for any future urban expansion. On the grounds, this process encounters a number of
difficulties which delays developing the strategic plans, and accordingly land owners are
encouraged to build informally. (Nada, 2014).
Banning the construction on a desert land owned by the state: the state is entitled to
protect public and private properties and eradicate any violations (Amnesty, 2011).
Furthermore, the government issued a number of laws and regulations to protect
agricultural land by limiting informal development on agricultural areas (Sims, 2008). In this
respect, the government issued a military declaration in 1996 which entailed that the illegal
expansion on agricultural land was a criminal act (USAID, 2010). In 2004, this declaration was
cancelled and replaced by law No.116/1983 which stated the illegality of constructing any buildings
on agricultural land or any practices to use agricultural areas for building purposes (Tadamun, 2014).

Unfortunately, the growth of informal areas has not been limited by the aforementioned
preventative measures, but rather they helped redirect the growth of informal settlements from
one area to another and increased corruption at the local level. For instance, the national building
standards set by the Housing and Building National Research Center (HBRC), are suitable for
middle and high classes housing units, but are not suitable for lower income families. This forces
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developers to work informally since they know that the building units they provide, which
comply with the national building codes, will not be suitable for their targeted population (Nada,
2014). As a result, the regulations are ignored and minimum standards for safety are not met.
Accordingly, the building code enforced benefits developers and local government officials and
harms residents, particularly of slums.

Interventionist approaches
Interventionist approaches include the following:
-

eviction, demolition and slum relocation,

-

in situ slum upgrading

-

and participatory upgrading (informal settlements)

Eviction, Demolition and Slum Relocation
The Informal Settlements Development Facility (ISDF)
ISDF provides a certain categorization of unsafe informal areas; they are given a grade
from one to four. Grade one defines the areas in which inhabitants lives are threatened due to
environmental hazards threatening to life such as rock slides railway accidents or flooding.
Grade two represents areas of inappropriate housing conditions. Grade three is the areas exposed
to health risks such as the lack of clean drinking water, improved sanitation or situated near to
industrial pollution. Grade four is the unsafe areas lacking security of tenure such as areas
located on lands owned by the state (ISDF, 2012).
This grading scale should prioritize the interventions of ISDF in unsafe areas. According
to ISDF, grade one residents should be relocated to a nearby neighboring area. Residents living
in grade two areas should either be relocated, or an in situ development should take place. As for
residents of grade three, the government should intervene to solve the public health issue by
developing public services. Grade four residents should be granted legalized land tenure (Runkel,
2009).
P a g e | 15

Another role of ISDF is implementing socio-economic programs concentrating on
empowering the population of informal settlements. Nevertheless, access to information is not
available about whether particular programs or interventions are implemented or not. Sometimes
residents’ houses are eradicated without previous communication or even consultation with
residents who are not formally notified through written notices (Tadamun, 2015). Even though
the grading system set by the ISDF to categorize unsafe areas is implying a rationalized approach
towards dealing with unsafe areas, yet this has not usually been adopted (Amnesty, 2011).
Relocating residents is when residents of a certain area are moved from one place to
another, which is usually at a remote distance from their original area. Based on a review of the
literature and the number of cases the researcher has come across, this approach represents
almost 80% of the government’s interventions in this respect. The government vacates the
houses, destroys them and residents are offered new houses, usually in public housing at low
rental rates. There are two types of relocation, either voluntary or by force. Voluntary relocation
is when citizens agree to the resettlement conditions that the government proposes, while forced
relocation takes place when residents do not have other choices and are subject to forced eviction
by security personnel (Patel, 2013).
Forced relocation according to international experiences necessitates that the process
should be rationalized and resorted to only as last solution. Besides, in case displacement is
inevitable, inhabitants ought to be fully compensated or provided with alternative housing that is
equivalent in quality and amenities to their original ones. In addition, the government should
facilitate and support the residents throughout the transition period to the new settlement.
Besides, the government should provide the needed help and assistance to the evacuated families
until they reestablish their former standards of living (Perera, 2014).
As previously mentioned, the ISDF is the entity concerned with classifying the unsafe
areas that should be removed and deciding if the inhabitants need to be relocated. However, in
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some cases, armed forces and security personnel are part of the eviction process along with the
governorate and ISDF. In such cases, demolition and clearance of the area, construction of new
houses and provision of public service are the responsibility of the governorate (Amnesty, 2011).
For further analysis of the relocation approach, the researcher has conducted a field work
in the area of Osman Housing as an example of a place to which some slum dwellers were
transferred as a solution for their unsafe areas. Chapter five of the thesis will demonstrate the
visit, interviews with the dwellers and the findings.
In Situ Slum Upgrading
Telal Zeinhom
Another approach adopted by the Egyptian government is the in situ slum upgrading
which entails providing the necessary development in the same area without having to move the
residents to remote locations (UN-Habitat, 2003). Based on a review of the literature and the number
of cases the researcher has come across, this approach represents only 20% of the government’s

interventions in this respect. An example of an area that was upgraded adopting this technique is
Telal Zeinhom which is a large squatter area located in old Cairo. The place was originally
provided by Cairo governorate, as temporal solution, for those who lost their houses for any
reason (Ghoneim, 2014). In a short time, poor people from other neighborhoods searching for
shelter resorted to the area and built their own dilapidated wooden huts (Tadamun, 2013).
In 1999, the upgrading project started as per the instructions of Suzan Mubarak after a
visit to the Red Crescent Society (RCS) in Zeinhum and witnessing the deteriorated conditions of
the area. RCS together with Cairo governorate, with the help of financial resources from
businessmen, as well as the participation of contractors who volunteered to build the units
without charging the governorate or RCS helped in implementing the project (Ghoneim, 2014).
The upgrading project was based on two main elements. The first element concentrated on
developing the educational, cultural and health levels of citizens. The second element
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concentrated on eradicating the current slums and establishing modern buildings according to the
standard building codes to provide healthy and environmental friendly area. Meanwhile, the
residents to be moved to temporal houses basically in Helwan, Nahda and Mokattam until the
work is concluded and they return to their original residence in Zeinhom (Tadamun, 2013).
Endorsed by political will, the rehabilitation project was implemented in three phases and
ended in 2011. During the first phase, 348 housing units in 29 buildings were constructed.
Throughout the second phase 972 housing units in 81 buildings were built. Within the third
phase, 1136 units in 71 buildings were constructed. During the period they spent away from their
original houses, households were offered some developmental activities including educational,
social, cultural, vocational and health programs. The activities included the following:
-

21 literacy classes were opened

-

Provision of enhancement classes for students.

-

Providing the necessary assistance for the return of students who left school for financial
reasons.

-

The establishment of a social and cultural center for women.

-

Training of youth through the establishment of an information technology center with the
help of the Ministry of Information.

-

Training on handicraft activities.

-

Health awareness campaigns.

-

The establishment of a hospital, laboratory and a pharmacy (Ghoneim, 2014).
Zeinhom Project Shortcomings
Unfortunately, in terms of sustainability, the level of services and maintenance provided

started to decline, particularly after the 2011 revolution which resulted in the loss of the political
support for the project embodied in the person of Suzan Mubarak. Furthermore, the work of
maintenance was transferred to the local district which resulted in the deterioration of public
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spaces, green areas as well as street lighting. This was shown in the fact that when street lamps
were burned, this was not done anymore. Consequently, the streets turned dark during the night
and residents had to extend wires from their homes to light lamps outside the buildings. In
addition, the gardens became barren due to misuse and lack of required maintenance. Besides,
when asked about the level of satisfaction towards the size of their assigned flats, many residents
complained from the fact that they were small and did not accommodate the size of their families
that vary from 4 to 8 members. This forced them to turn the living room into another bedroom
for their kids. The same complaint was raised regarding the small size of the bathroom and
kitchen (Tadamun, 2013).
As for job opportunities in the area, most of the residents complained about the provided
opportunities for men. They explained that most of the training programs provided during the
implementation of the project were for women. Considering the fact that the residents of
Zeinhom are of very low income, this required providing small business opportunities for them,
but the project only provided insufficient places for this purpose. Accordingly, the residents lost
their shops after the upgrading of the area and the removal of their source of living and were not
able to get any alternative after returning to the area. Therefore, some residents had to make a
place to earn money from, by making some illegal changes and extensions to their houses
(Ghoneim, 2014).
Zeinhom case shows that in situ slum upgrading is fundamental, yet the government’s
neglect of the socio-economic context of the residents before the upgrading has caused a
significant dissatisfaction on the part of residents. It also resulted in the decrease of sustainability
in the social dimension during and after the project. In terms of sustainability, the project failed
to maintain the required level of provided services and maintenance.

P a g e | 19

Participatory Upgrading

One of the accepted and common approaches in developing countries today is
participatory slum improvement (UN-Habitat, 2003). This approach addresses community
integration in the rehabilitation projects. Upgrading in this sense would focus on community
needs as determined by its members and would guarantee the sustainability of the project. A
participatory approach when applied correctly, conditions will improve and dwellers will become
satisfied (Khalifa, 2011). A basic element of a participatory upgrade is collecting data on the
specified location accurately by the community members themselves.
Hai el Salam
An early case, which is considered the first one, of a participatory upgrading project is
Hai el Salam in Ismailia. This project was implemented mainly for the purpose of reconstructing
the Suez Canal area after the long war with Israel (Matteucci, 2006). The reconstruction plans
were made by British consultants in collaboration with the United Kingdom Official
Development Assistance (ODA) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). In
cooperation with Egyptian experts, the Ismailia Master Plan (IMP) was developed to upgrade a
number of areas with deteriorated conditions. In 1978, Hai el Salam in al-Hekr area was selected
for being a major slum area in the city that needed redevelopment. This was a considerable
transformation in the government’s strategy that has always been demolition and relocation of
residents to remote areas. The project proposed to guarantee security of tenure to the residents
and provide basic services for successful results (Ibrahim, 2014).
The British consultants were keen not to present the conventional approaches in this
project through providing housing units that do not meet the residents’ requirement, but they
rather proposed a new approach of encouraging the dwellers to build their own houses and also
own them. This original approach at the time contributed to better utilization of public resources
in developing the existing deteriorated areas with the supply of minimal infrastructure and
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services. This was implemented through proposing a set of new policies for the provision of
security of tenure, infrastructure and building materials to poor families. This is in addition to
simplifying the administrative procedures for acquiring loans to help the poor residents construct
their houses (Matteucci, 2006).
The outcomes of the project were seen in infrastructure improvement that turned this
poor and marginalized area of the city into a modern and developed location. The success of the
project was mainly due to the resident’s active involvement and participation in implementation.
This resulted in turning the project into an alternative to the conventional authoritarian top-down
approaches previously adopted by the Egyptian government. Unfortunately, this conception of
involving the community was not replicated in any further initiatives. Yet, it stands as a prove
that slums can be upgraded into normal city districts through dwellers participation that
encourages their investment in improving their housing conditions.
Participatory Development Program (PDP)
Another example of a participatory project that took place in Egypt in cooperation with
aid agencies is the Participatory Development Program (PDP) when the Egyptian government
sought the help of the German government in its endeavor to find a sustainable resolution for the
informal areas in Egypt. The Egyptian Ministry of Planning, the German Technical Cooperation
(GIZ) and the German Financial Cooperation (KFW), in addition to the Egyptian Ministry of
Local Development, NGOs, and the three governorates of Cairo, Giza, and Qalioubiya
implemented the project. It has been carried out from 2004 to 2014, then extended later until
2018 (Nour, 2011). The program was launched in two pilot projects, Boulaq el-Dakrour in Giza
governorate and Manshiet Nasser in Cairo governorate. The goal of the program was to alleviate
poverty in urban areas and achieve sustainable urban development through social inclusion and
good governance (Piffero, 2010)
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The first model for this participatory urban upgrading approach was Al-Amer Street, one
of the busiest and central streets in Boulaq el-Dakrour, where GIZ wanted to demonstrate that
the participation of the population can be a solution for urban upgrading. In this project, the
district and GIZ supplied material and equipment at reasonable prices. The interventions were
mainly street paving, painting of house facades, establishment of a recreational space and tree
planting. This street included a number of schools, a youth club and a vocational training center.
The population participated actively and nominated a representative who was entitled to collect
money from inhabitants and buy the needed materials for painting the facades. They also took
part on the decision making about transforming an empty space that was not used effectively
into a recreational area to include a playground and a computer center (Nour, 2011).
The second intervention was in Zeinin Street as per the request of the Governor after
witnessing the success of the first model. Zeinin Street was suffering from traffic congestion
and the prevalence of street vendors stands. Unfortunately, this second intervention was not
successful as the first one due to the failure of space reorganization which hindered shopkeepers
from displaying their merchandise properly in the street as well as the fact that the new traffic
direction did not allow mini-buses to stop as frequently as possible to pick up passengers. What
hindered the success of this second model of intervention was mainly the unwillingness of
traffic authorities to get involved in the process, as well as the opposition of the shopkeepers to
adhere to the new limits set for exposing their merchandise. (Piffero, 2009).
As for the environmental field, a series of activities were initiated within the project
including garbage collection and organizing awareness cleaning campaigns. This involved the
participation of around 200 university students. In addition, training was conducted for a
number of environmental pioneers. This resulted in a partial progress in the solid waste
collections since the containers were not sufficient and garbage mountains remained to be a
feature observed in the district (Nour, 2011).
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Among the difficulties that faced the implementation of this participatory project was
overestimating the level of support to the concept of participatory upgrading by the Egyptian
government. This was shown in the fact that during the first stages, local authorities were
hesitant towards accepting or perceiving the project's activities. Besides, the unavailability of
financial Egyptian resources made the project difficult to achieve, especially with the
centralized budgeting system of the government that created obstacles in reaching the higher
administrative systems to fulfill the required needs. Therefore, enabling governorates as a start
and then district administrations should have been implemented for better utilization of sectorial
budget allocation (Nour, 2011).
In light of the above demonstrated approaches and cases, the formation of slums is a
direct product of the continuous unsuccessful and insufficient practices by the Egyptian
government towards dealing with informal areas and slums. We have an opportunity to move
forward in this respect if we study some of the international experiences in the developing world
and attempt applying some of their success factors in the Egyptian context.
Moreover, the argument in this study is intended to verify the following hypotheses:


The existence of slum challenge in Egypt is due to the government’s
inability to effectively deal with it through the adoption of effective
policies and sustainable solutions.



Since other developing countries have developed globally and acknowledged
successful experiences in dealing with slums, the success factors learned out of
these practices can be useful to Egypt.



If the Egyptian government adopts the success factors learned from international
experiences after adjusting them to the Egyptian context, it can effectively face
the slum challenge and improve its global position in acting on the issue.
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Relevance of International Experiences from Other Developing Countries
As mentioned above, the Egyptian government needs to learn from the success of
international experiences in dealing with slums in other parts of the world.
In this respect, we need to adopt some of the ready-to-use principles and measures based
on the analysis of international practices in dealing with slums. Thus, chapter four of the thesis
includes a study of some international practices in the developing world on dealing with slums.
In spite of the fact that cities included in this analysis are quite different in terms of culture,
history, economy, geography as well as some social and organizational differences, yet there are
similar issues in the necessary approaches for achieving results.

Potential Review/Improvement of Policies and Legislations Addressing Slums in
Egypt
It is apparent that the Egyptian government needs to do more than providing a betterquality infrastructure since this could not solely solve the issue of informal settlements and
slums. Accordingly, the government is obliged to set policies and stipulate adequate tools that
would help it find comprehensive solutions to such problems (Hegazy, 2015). In chapter six of
the thesis, a detailed set of recommendations is included for the Egyptian government in order to
develop and enhance its practices towards a successful slum upgrading approach.
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Methodology
The discussion in this thesis basically builds on a qualitative analysis technique referring
to a number of secondary resources and demonstrating the findings in a logical and integrated
manner. The data mainly consists of information on the current Egyptian government’s
interventions and data on the experiences in the developing world, documented interview
transcripts, field notes from observations as well as document analysis. Resources consulted in
the thesis are mainly reports of international agencies, books, country reports and journal articles.
The research will focus on analyzing the success factors of other experiences in developing
countries to find out the possibility of applying the measures taken by other cities in Egypt.
Besides, the researcher selected Osman Housing (Masaken Osman) in Sixth of October
City to be the case study of this paper. The place is an example of an area to which the residents
of some slum areas in Cairo were relocated as a solution offered by the government for their
unsafe areas. The purpose of selecting a case study is to find out the level of satisfaction of its
residents and how the government intervened to solve their housing problem.
A number of in-depth interviews were conducted with the dwellers of Osman Housing
for the sake of close interacting with them and learning more about their living conditions, the
availability of facilities and basic services, as well as other needs and necessities from their
perspective. In this sense, the dwellers’ voices, opinions and stories are heard which is important
for understanding the impact of resettlement on their lives, and hence is key to developing
effective intervention strategies.
Furthermore, this study includes some proposed measures, principles and procedures for
an effective and successful slum upgrading processes learned from international experience.
These principles should be considered the basic criteria for the design and implementation of
upgrading programs in Egypt. Adopting such criteria guarantees a successful upgrading process.
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Sampling
Non-probability purposive sampling is the research sampling method used in this study
as the main goal is in-depth idiographic understanding rather than general nomothetic
understanding of the life of Osman Housing dwellers. This idiographic method adopted
throughout the research helped studying the behavior of human subjects involved in the study by
a detailed analysis of individual cases. The main focus is on detailed description rather than
on generalizations (Battaglia, 2011).
Furthermore, the researcher adopted the snowballing technique to collect as much
information as possible from different parties. The researcher interviewed six families living in
Osman Housing who volunteered in participating and those initial participants helped adding
four additional study participants.
Ethical Considerations
Considering the fact that this thesis involves interacting with human subjects and
collecting data related to human issues, the researcher obtained all the required approvals from
the Institutional Review Board (IRB) prior to conducting any interviews. In addition, the
researcher paid the necessary attention to other ethical considerations in the process of data
collection. The researcher was aware of the responsibility of conducting the research and
communicated appropriately with the participants. Before conducting the interviews, participants
were fully aware of their rights, what risks they might face (if any) and what benefits they might
gain. They were also informed that participating was completely voluntary and up to them
whether to take part in the study or not and that responses would be taken with high
confidentiality. All audiotape recordings and interview transcripts were safely kept. No revealing
or identifying information were included in this study. The researcher was keen to apply the
above-mentioned procedures so that validity and reliability of the research would be realized.
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Chapter Three: Literature Review
In addition to the literature reviewed in the Conceptual Framework chapter, chapter three
discusses the different definitions, dangers, causes and economic effects of the slums
phenomenon worldwide and particularly in Egypt. Besides, more literature is covered in the
chapters of International Experience, Conclusion and Recommendations.

Slums
‘Slum’ is a general term under which different classifications of settlements are included,
such as informal settlements, shantytowns and low-income communities. ‘Ashwa’iyyat’ is the
term that is known in Egypt for slums, which means ‘haphazard’ or ‘disordered’ (Sims, 2008).
This term usually refers to informal areas that are basically characterized by narrow streets, very
high residential densities, the deprivation of open spaces and inadequate infrastructure and
services. It also refers to the areas which are classified as unplanned and constructed on illegal
lands and suffer from poor infrastructure and public services to fulfill their basic needs.
Like many other parts of the world, Egypt is witnessing rapid growth in its cities. 43% of
Egypt’s population lives in 223 cities, 56% of which are concentrated in Greater Cairo and
Alexandria (UN-Habitat, 2010). This rapid urbanization is considered one of the major problems
facing urban development in Egypt and is one of the key reasons of the growth of informal and
unsafe areas in Egypt.
A survey was carried out by ISDF in 2009 and showed that unsafe areas in Cairo contain
approximately 1.1 million inhabitants (Khalifa, 2011). These residents are in deep need of instant
actions to enhance their livelihood conditions.
One of the main concerns of the United Nations is facing the serious challenge of slums
and addressing the needs of slum dwellers to the access of basic urban services (UN-Habitat,
2003). According to the UN-Habitat, slum dwellers are basically a group of people who lack one
or more of the following:
P a g e | 27

- Adequate-living area in terms of space.
- Appropriate shelter of a permanent nature capable of protecting from probable
climate changes

- Access to pure clean water
- Access to proper sanitation facilities
- Security of tenure
This criterion is also adopted by ISDF in its categorization of unsafe areas.
It is worth pointing out the New Urban Agenda adopted by the United Nations
Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat III) took place in Quito,
Ecuador from 17 to 20 October 2016, and signed by Egypt (Un-Habitat, 2016). The UN
describes the document as an “inclusive, action-oriented” document, and proclaims that it will
guide the next twenty years of sustainable and transformative urban development worldwide.
Similar to all previous UN-Habitat conferences, the Habitat III addressed a crisis; this
crisis entails the problems facing cities which require urgent actions. Among the commitments
included in the New Urban Agenda (NUA) is providing basic services for all citizens, including
access to proper affordable housing, safe drinking water and sanitation, education, healthcare and
family planning, culture and access to communication technologies (United Nations, 2016).
Moreover, the conference addressed the fact that cities are some of the most unequal locations, in
terms of basic rights, wealth, and political power. The NUA addresses the need to make cities
more inclusive and comprehensive by engaging slum dwellers, women, minority groups, youth
as well as the elderly (Un-Habitat, 2016). The NUA considers informal settlements and slums
not just a matter of housing quality, they rather represent the quality of life that people have,
their health conditions and their chances at a good education.
For Egypt to sign on the NUA is a step forward towards acknowledging the rights of
slum dwellers by taking bold new decisions such as granting property rights to slum dwellers and
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stopping forced evictions. For the commitment towards and implementing the NUA in Egypt,
proper transposing of the new international urban agenda to the national and local level should
be identified through clear mechanism for implementation.
Another description of slums is that: “Slums are neglected parts of cities where housing
and living conditions are appallingly poor” (Hatita, 2014). The common definition of ‘slum’
suggests that it is: “…a contiguous settlement where the inhabitants are characterized as having
inadequate housing and basic services” (Steering Committee on Urbanization, 2011). A slum is
often neglected by the public authorities and not considered equal part of the city (Khalifa,
2011). Slums are places where health conditions are degenerated because of the complexity of
accessing healthcare services.
The fact that the issue of slums is becoming persistent in many cities all over the world,
this led scholars to try and find causes and solutions to the problem in order to analyze the
phenomenon. For example, John Turner, one of the most famous scholars who adopted the
notion of self-help housing, argued that the slum dwellers are able to improve their own lives
through upgrading and constructing their informal houses. He believed that the slum inhabitants
had the right to upgrade their houses based on their needs (Runkel, 2009). Turner argued that this
approach led to people-centered development and urban poor’s autonomy. He added that
inhabitants may add elements that fit their needs and life situations as per their resources.
Turner’s Self-help approach was criticized by critics arguing that it helped to maintain the status
quo and did not challenge the sources of inequalities and injustice (Frediani, 2009).
Another theorist is Nakamura who advocated that slum upgrading was secure land
tenure since there was a solid association between security of tenure and housing construction
(Gelder, 2007). He believed that there was constantly a struggle and fear on the dwellers part
from the probability of eviction which resulted in lack of trust that led to poor investment in their
houses. He argued that if people felt more secure and expected future benefits from their houses,
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they would be more likely to invest in construction. He added that attractive physical attributes,
such as the size, layout, amenities and of course infrastructure, would encourage slum dwellers
to invest in construction (Mukhija, 2002).
Slums in Egypt are a phenomenon resulted from urbanization and other socio-economic
changes that occurred through the past four decades (Abdelhalim, 2014). Most of the Egyptian
cities are now characterized by urban informality. One of the misconceptions made by the
Egyptian government is perceiving slums as the fault of their dwellers rather than being victims
of neglect and poverty. This perception of judging slums mainly on their poor physical
conditions is the main reason behind the government’s ineffective approach towards removing
them and relocating inhabitants.
During the course of the last few decades, a number of policy approaches to slums have
been sought globally, many of which focused on interventions for defending the rights of slum
residents as well as enabling them to enhance their living conditions (UN-Habitat, 2003).
Considering the fact that, in most cases, the critical analysis and lessons learned from previous
endeavors and attempts in dealing with major challenges lead to effective policy approaches, this
can be very useful to the Egyptian case, with developing new policy approaches in response to
the new requirements.
Slums provide poor basic services and low-quality housing for their dwellers (Runkel,
2009). It is worth mentioning that the prevalence of slum areas varies dramatically across cities
of the developing world (UN-Habitat, 2003). In other words, there are regional distinctions in
terms of slums; slums in the Middle East are very different in physical and safety conditions
from those in Africa or in South East Asia. For instance, slums range from high residential
density buildings in Hong Kong to shacks made of mud in Cape Town and each variation has a
different name (UN-HABITAT, 2006). For example, in India, slum areas or “chawls” are usually
a crowded block consisting of apartments having only one room with shared bathrooms. They
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also have a different form of slums called the “zopadpatti” or a hut made of fragile materials,
regularly situated in a packed slum area inside or on the borders of a city.
It is easy to identify the serious concerns and impacts of slums on human wellbeing as
follows:


Hazardous health conditions causing slum children to suffer from various diseases
such as pneumonia, malaria, diarrhea and measles (Homeless International, 2013).



Lack of education and consequently lack of the skills needed to acquire decent
jobs (Steering Committee on Urbanization, 2011).



Unsafety of women; violence against women is usually recurrent (Mayra Gómez,
2008).



Slum dwellers are more likely subject to natural disasters and climate change (Ian
Douglas, 2008).



Political and social insularity or exclusion that is evident in deprivation of voting
in elections as well as exclusion from development policies and fundamental
rights (Nijman, 2009). Accordingly, tension between different social groups may
easily occur as a result of being deprived of the same rights that other city
dwellers enjoy, which in turn may lead to social exclusion .

The issue of slums is very critical all over the world. It is evident in the Millennium
Development Goals (MDG’s) and particularly MDG #7, target # 4 which states “Achieve, by
2020, a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers” (UN, 2015).
In addition, almost all opinions support and call for finding a concrete and immediate solution for

it. In this sense, many scholars and researchers tackled the issue almost in the same manner of
highlighting the danger of the phenomenon and the necessity of combating it. Other perspectives
concentrated on highlighting its negative impacts that are reflected on the economic situations
for some countries.
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The settlements which poor people build in cities and urban areas are often referred to
and defined as “informal settlements” (Pieterse, 2011). This is because they are usually
constructed without formal government decisions or normal legal processes. Slums are
considered a phenomenon that is regularly associated with the fast growing urbanization process
that took place in most developing countries throughout the past four decades, and of course
Egypt is one of those countries (Abdelhalim, 2014). Consequently, governments face serious
challenges in confronting this rapid shift of living in cities rather than in rural areas (Runkel,
2009). The need to provide houses to an increasing number of inhabitants results in offering
insufficient adequate housing options leaving a great number of inhabitants with no option other
than living with no formal permissions in informal areas. Informality, on a wider scope, can be
referred to as a cultural phenomenon stemmed from the lack of the rule of law and rampant
corruption on the part of urban management (Abdelhalim, 2014).
In addition, the common fact that slums or informal settlements exist in most cities of
developing countries, providing a sort of informality in housing delivery mechanism, has been a
critical challenge to economic growth (Debraj Roy, 2014). This is best exemplified in many
cities in Africa, Asia and Latin America, and fortunately, many of the cities in these areas
succeeded to overcome the slums problem.

Spatial Inequality
Spatial inequality is very common and evident in the Egyptian context. In many areas
quality of life and the level of basic services vary significantly from one place to another. This is
evident in the fact that the provision of basic infrastructure, sanitation, quality of hospitals,
school performance, employment opportunities, the quality of air and even the standard of clean
water can drastically differ from one place to another. The degree of spatial inequality increases
in Cairo since poor services and infrastructure together with poverty are actually prevalent in
some areas, limiting economic and social flexibility (Lobao, 2002). In contrast, the concept of
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spatial justice means guaranteeing equivalent access to public services, including education,
medical treatment and job opportunities. Spatial justice is not only improving the quantity of
public services in a certain area but also improving the quality (Tadamun, 2015).
In Egypt, on the local community level, the deficiency of planning tools is clear since the
actual needs of people are not transparently reflected, and hence many forms of deprivation
remain unseen. Whether an area is labeled as “unplanned” or “unsafe” is not enough, spatial
inequality is evident in the fact that there are planned and safe areas, yet lack basic services or
characterized by urban deterioration. In addition, on the different ministries fiscal planning part,
budgets are distributed to directorates in the different governorates, without a monitoring system
to control the distribution of those funds at the lower administrative part. Local development
programs on the district level use a very small proportion of public funds. (Tadamun, 2015). The
gap between local development needs and the unfair amount of government investments for
those areas, compared to its own investments in formal districts, reflects the lack of effective
designing ways for measuring and visualizing the distribution of financial funds among urban
areas.

Poverty
In most cities, there is a direct two-directional relationship between poverty and
deterioration of the environment which is usually reflected in the slum areas of those cities. Lack
of infrastructure, poor drainage and absence of waste disposal systems are common features in
many streets in Cairo (Araby, 2002). Disparities between the areas with adequate and inadequate
services and infrastructure are obvious. Cairo suffered from high rates of urbanization due to the
increased number of rural migrants coming to the city and due to the lack of legal land for
housing and infrastructure which contributed to the creation of informal housing. This
maximized the number of poor people taking illegal lands as well as improper forms of housing
as their permanent houses.
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Increased poverty together with fast urbanization and widening social divide are some
reasons behind slum formation in previous years. This resulted in degrading the environmental
conditions and had some negative consequences on the health conditions of residents (Arnott,
2009). According to a survey conducted by the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and
Statistics (CAPMAS) in 2015 addressing income and expenditures, about 27.8% of the Egyptian
population is currently living below the poverty line (CAPMAS, 2015). This high rate of poverty
has contributed to the prevalence of informal settlements, particularly absolute poverty. In the
other direction, slum conditions perpetuate the poverty of Egyptians living in them.

The Right to Housing
Every citizen has the right to live in an adequate shelter where he/she enjoys security,
peace, and dignity in a healthy environment. According to a report by UN-Habitat on the
challenge of slums in 2003, this shelter should include protection against arbitrary destruction or
forced evictions. People should have the freedom to choose where to live and to move freely
from one place to another. This right also includes entitlements to security of tenure and
participation in the decision-making process related to housing issues at all levels of government.
Most national constitutions safeguard the right to housing, but reserve the right of the state to
control the right to property and may evict individuals of their property as long as it is not
arbitrary or if this serves the public need. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights mentions
the right to property in Article 17, which states that “Everyone has the right to own property
alone as well as in association with others. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.”
(Pieterse, 2011).
As for Egypt, Article number seventy eight of the 2014 Egyptian Constitution guarantees
the right to housing. It reads as follows:
“The State shall ensure the citizens' right to adequate, safe and healthy housing in a
manner which preserves human dignity and achieves social justice. The State shall devise
P a g e | 34

a national housing plan which upholds the environmental particularity and ensures the
contribution of personal and collaborative initiatives in its implementation. The State
shall also regulate the use of State lands and provide them with basic utilities within the
framework of comprehensive urban planning which serves cities and villages and a
population distribution strategy. This is to be applied in a manner serving the public
interest, improving the quality of life for citizens and safeguards the rights of future
generations. The State shall also devise a comprehensive national plan to address the
problem of unplanned slums, which includes re-planning, provision of infrastructure and
utilities, and improvement of the quality of life and public health. In addition, the State
shall guarantee the provision of resources necessary for implementing such plan within a
specified period of time.” (Egypt's Constitution of 2014, 2016).
Nevertheless, secure tenure is not guaranteed for almost 44% of Egypt’s population who do not
enjoy clear legal tenure. This has caused many vulnerable residents to become victims of forced
evictions. In the period between 2011 and 2013, more than 21 forced evictions were
implemented without fair compensation to thousands of evictees. This was shown in 2014 when
the riot police with instructions from Cairo Governorate, without earlier notice or consultation,
demolished the houses of around 1,000 families in Ezbet el-Nakhl. Some of the inhabitants were
re-housed, while many others became homeless (Amnesty, 2011).
The right to housing is also affected by the continuingly widening gap between income
and house prices. Whereas house prices and rents keep increasing, incomes for poor and
extremely poor households have either remained stagnant or decreased (CAPMAS, 2013). The
lack of State control over commodification of land and real estate is a major factor for this
dilemma. In addition, since the Ministry of Housing (MoH) controls a large land bank for urban
development, it thus controls real estate prices to its advantage. In spite of the fact that the
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income housing, yet the provided housing programs have not benefited the poor for several
years. Inflation of land prices is also a direct result of the fact that some governmental agencies
own large land banks and manipulate policies for their own benefit. Thus, demand for adequate
affordable housing continues to overpass supply since Egypt fails to regulate the real estate
market and implement a pro poor housing policy. In absence of a policy directing public and
private investments towards affordable housing, the higher income segments benefit most of
such investments (Sims, 2008).
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Chapter Four: International Experiences
In-Situ Redevelopment
Rio De Janeiro, Brazil
The history of slums in the city of Rio de Janeiro in Brazil summarizes an industrial and
infrastructure development story (UN-Habitat, 2003). The existence of slums, known as
“favelas”, was basically due to urbanization together with high fertility rates. This has resulted in
the displacement of the poor who had no other chance but resorting to collective efforts for
constructing cheap housing away from the city. The lack of affordable and reasonable housing
and a transportation system increased the further spread of those slums all around the city
(Magalhães, 2012).
By the 1970s, it was announced that 13 per cent of the city inhabitants lived in slums.
Under several military dictatorships 100,000 slum dwellers were evicted within a period of two
to three years (Perlman, 2004). It is worth mentioning that the housing policy in Brazil did not
involve the federal government and functions at the sub-national level. Prior to the 1990s, statelevel policies served informal settlements in the city of Rio de Janeiro. Then, a decentralization
trend was introduced through the 1988 constitution. During the 1990s, the city of Rio de Janeiro
worked on including informal settlements into the city’s public services and started the process
of legitimizing the existence of informal settlements. Hence, favelas became legitimate
communities (Soares, 2005). They significantly grew to the extent that around 25% of the
population lived in slums, yet exclusion increased. During the 1990s, the government, in
response, developed a new municipal housing policy. However, the socio-spatial segregation of
the city of Rio and its dwellers continued to increase ((IDB), 2004).
Like many other Brazilian cities, the city of Rio de Janeiro suffered from a serious
informal urbanization, which in turn resulted in the rise of favelas that became a reality and an
irreversible process at the same time. Despite the previous measures taken by the public
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authorities to halt the expansion of slums by eradication or relocation of families to other
locations far from the city, such efforts did not succeed or present a viable solution (Magalhães,
2012)
In response to the increase of slums, the Brazilian government implemented a number of
significant slum programs (UN-Habitat, 2003). One of these programs was the Urbanization
Program for Popular Settlements in Rio de Janeiro (Favela Bairro). Favela Bairro aimed at
incorporating slums within the city by facilitating access to basic urban and social services
(Castro, 2009). Total amount of the project was US$300 million, an amount of US$180 million
was received as loan from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and an amount of
US$120 million was received in the form of co-finance from the local government of Rio de
Janeiro.
Actors of the Favela Bairro
The project was collaboration between the (IDB) and the national government. At the
beginning, IDB managed the policy and slum upgrading was the main concern. Nevertheless,
after the inauguration of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the Municipal Housing Department became
the leader of the project (Fiori, 2000).
In June 1992, the Brazilian government issued a Complementary Law that initiated a
Regulatory Plan for the city of Rio de Janeiro (Magalhães, 2012). Besides, the GEAP (Grupo
Executivo de Assentamentos Populares, Popular Settlements Executive Group) which included
eight departments and seven municipal bodies of Rio de Janeiro was established to develop
serious actions to restrain urban decline. In 1994, the project Favela Bairro was launched with
funds from the Office of the Mayor. Besides, an additional loan of US$180 million was received
in December 1995. By these resources accompanied by US$120 million, the Popular Settlements
Urbanization Program was established (Programa de Urbanizacao de Assentamentos Populares,
or PROAP II). This succeeded in financing a considerable extension of Favela Bairro to reach 54
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slum areas. The program also integrated basic infrastructure works in eight informal lot
divisions.
The basic infrastructure components of the project included water supply, sanitary
systems and illumination equipment and road pavements. Access to this infrastructure was
accomplished with the help of local and central agencies (Soares, 2005).
The social component of the program developed and included establishing early day care
centers. Besides, training and community activities were added, as well as specific modalities
that included the formation of agentes comunitarios: members of the slum area or favela who
received training in issues of community development, cleanliness and sanitization, and in other
areas of the program. In addition, during the second phase of the program, more favelas were
selected and a property titling program, that was initially planned for, started implementation
(Soares, 2005).
Favela Bairro was targeting medium‐sized communities, however, unfortunately,
populations with high urbanization costs were not included. The government also executed other
programs addressing smaller sizes of slums along with programs to urbanize largest favela
communities (Perlman, 2004).
In order to fill this gap and target larger informal settlements, the Growth Acceleration
Program, a program which focused on infrastructure, was launched in 2007. The program was
considered a strategic investment which incorporates management initiatives together with
public works. The main focus of the program was investing in energy, logistics and social
development. The budget of the project in its first phase was US$306 billion and it lasted from
2007 to 2010 (Magalhães, 2012).
Favela Bairro Objective
The main objective of the program was enhancing the standard of life of the poor
population existing in favelas in the city of Rio de Janeiro by investing in infrastructure and
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conducting social development actions. The program consisted of four modules: serving children
and teenagers, providing job opportunities, institutional improvement which to apply a
monitoring and evaluation comprehensive system, together with training for officials in the
Mayor’s office, training of workers and civil society organizations, and finally actions for
disseminating information about the program to the community.
The program’s objectives are listed below:


Improving the standard of life of poor inhabitants living in slums and irregular
settlements in the city of Rio de Janeiro (Magalhães, 2012). This was done by
reaching 56,000 families in 52 slums and 17 irregular settlements that used to
have no access to the main services.
o Providing basic sanitation.
o Street paving and public lighting.
o Eliminating the major geological risks in 100 percent of slums.
o Allowing a participatory approach for the community to participate in the
planning and execution phases.
o Providing educational campaigns in support of the planned projects,
environmental conservation and protection, maintenance of the sanitary
and other infrastructure.
o Land-titling regularization.
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Serving children and teenagers.



Providing employment and facilitating income generation



Institutional Improvement ((IDB), 2004).

Below are the exact program’s objectives with the accomplishments:
Planned Objective

Accomplished Objectives

Module 1 (Urban Infrastructure) - Integrated Urbanization
By the end of the project, objective was to reach

75,796 families were reached in 62 slum areas

56,000 families in 52 slum areas and 17 irregular

and 16 informal settlements.

settlements that used to have no access to the
basic services.
(a) Infrastructure

(a) Infrastructure

(i) Providing sewage system:

(i) Providing sewage system:



100 percent of dwellers should be served

potable water and 90 percent had sanitary

drainage net as well as a sanitary system.

services.

Paving 100 percent of the central streets

(ii) Street paving and illumination:


and 80 percent of the adjacent ones;


96 percent of dwellers had access to

with access to potable water, a pluvial

(ii) Street paving and illumination:




9,890 lighting points were established and
properly functioning.

Providing public lighting to 100 percent
of the central streets, and 60 percent of the
adjacent ones.



Establishing 11,132 lighting points.

(iii) Geological risks:


Eradicate or alleviate the major geological

(iii) Geological risks:


alleviated in the urbanized area.

risks in 100 percent of slums.
(iv) Social equipment:


Each favela or informal settlement must
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100 percent of risks were eradicated or

(iv) Social equipment:


All favelas had at least one daycare center

have at least one daycare center or any
another form of child care from infancy to

in addition to a sports area.


four years as well as one recreational area.


39 daycare centers and 51 sports areas
were established.

To establish 49 daycare centers and 69
sports areas.

(b) Community development

(b) Community development

(i) Community participation

(i) Community participation



100 percent of households in every slum



area or informal settlement should be

Slum dwellers actively participated in all
the stages of the project.

reached and invited to participate in the
different activities of the program by
taking part in at least one of the meetings
and any other community activity.
(ii) Providing educational campaigns in

(ii) Providing educational campaigns in

support of the planned projects,

support of the planned projects,

environmental conservation and protection,

environmental conservation and protection,

maintenance of the sanitary and other

maintenance of the sanitary and other

infrastructure.

infrastructure.


Slum dwellers were satisfied by the level
of maintenance after concluding the
program.

(c) Land-titling regularization:


Six months after the works were done, all
dwellers should have security of tenure.
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(c) Land-titling regularization:


Goal accomplished

Estimated Cost:

Actual Cost:

US$422 million

US$424.661 million
Module 2 (Social Action) - Serving Children and Teenagers

(a) Serving children from birth to 4 years

(a) Serving children from birth to 4

old


Nurseries: only 8,400 children received

Years old


Nurseries: Goal surpassed: 8,589

service by nurseries, which constituted 30

children received service; all nurseries

percent of the targeted number for a proper

equipped with competent personnel,

dietary as well as psychosocial service.

proper circumstances for dietary and
psychosocial service were accomplished.

(b) Serving children between 7 to 14

(b) Serving children between 7 and 14





Retaining students and education

Retaining students and education

reinforcement: 2,750 children and

reinforcement: 2,750 children were

teenagers should be retained in schools and

retained in school and 1,658 were

their school performance should be

prepared.

improved.


Providing guidance and support to youth

A total of 4,128 youth attended the

from 15 to 17 years via implementing

community programs and received the

community programs.

intended guidance and support.

(c) Support for groups in high-risk situations:




The program should care for at least 50

(c) Support for groups in high-risk situations:


86,179 places were created to care for

percent of teenagers and children in high-

children and teenagers in high-risk

risk situations acknowledged in each

situations

community.

P a g e | 43



Special attention should be paid for at least

100 percent of disabled children were

50 percent of children with disabilities and

taken care of and integrated into social

integrating them into the community and

life.


social life.




Achieved and surpassed: 96 percent of

At least 70 percent of the women

registered women were trained and

registered in the program should be trained

received an authorization to act as

as “guardians” for their children against

“guardians” for their children and the

social exclusion.

community against social exclusion.

Estimated Cost:

Actual Cost:

US$25.5 million

US$19.231 million
Module 3 - Providing Employment Opportunities

(a) Specialized training


16,442 workers and 80 percent of students

(a) Specialized training


should be trained in fifteen training fields.


training in different fields.

2,100 specialists should receive practical
assistance and training.



4,400 workers should complete the
complementary programs offered by
school and should receive their diplomas

Goal achieved and exceeded: 2,889
specialists were trained.

(b) Increasing educational services:


38,500 students and workers received

(b) Increasing educational services:


13,319 individuals were assisted by the
project and 5,215 got graduated.

and certificates.
Estimated Cost:

Actual Cost:

US$9 million

US$9.476 million
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Module 4 – Institutional Development
(a) Monitoring and evaluation:


Six months after concluding the work, an

(a) Monitoring and evaluation:


investigation should be implemented.

Achieved: a computerized system was
created and a research was applied in 38
communities in 2004/2005.

(b) Technical assistance




100 officials should be trained in

(b) Technical assistance


Goal achieved and surpassed: 100

implementation and management of social

officials were trained in the Mayor’s

projects and applied engineering.

office and 764 technicians received the

Management methods should be

required training.

introduced and control systems of its
decentralized activities should be
implemented
(c) Social communication:


Producing and distributing videos, posters

(c) Social communication:


11 educational videos and DVDs were

media ads and didactic materials for

produced, 30,000 brochures. Besides,

disseminating information about the

3,000 books as well as a weekly

program.

publication reaching one million people in
Rio de Janeiro were distributed.

Estimated Cost:

Actual Cost:

US$4.5 million

US$5.19 million
Table 1: Favela Bairro Planned and Accomplished Objectives (Magalhães, 2012)

Favela Bairro Implementation
Resident associations were the liaison between departments of public housing and
architects. The second phase of the program witnessed the initiation of social programs such as
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child care centers, community development, training and hygiene. Moreover, in 1997, the
Municipal Employment Department was established to co‐ordinate programs such as training,
employment and income generation. Implementation was led by Secretaria Municipal de
Habitação (SMH) in cooperation with other sectors. Over time, the involved sectors started to
shift their priorities as per the corresponding circumstances. Additionally, NGOs were involved
to run community service centers and other social projects. Finally, the private sector was
assigned the work of housing construction and infrastructure (Perlman, 2004).
Favela Bairro Impacts
Most of the goals were achieved during the first phase of the project. Over 90% of
activities and 284 public works and other projects, were accomplished in the target favelas
(Magalhães, 2012). Interventions were made in 38 of the targeted 54 favelas. Three main outputs
were within the framework of the project: water access including connection to sewers, paved
streets and establishment of nurseries. An analysis by income revealed that the areas with the
poorest population benefitted from access to potable water, sanitary and rubbish collection,
whereas the areas with richer population only did to a lesser extent (Soares, 2005).
The following table indicates degree of satisfaction regarding main improvements in
services for slum areas which were served by the Favela Bairro program and those which were
not served by the program:
Sewage

Garbage

Public

Collection

Lighting

Drainage Street
Network

Favela Bairro

80%

87%

73%

73%

80%

Non-Participating in

40%

35%

35%

22%

12%

Favela Bairro
Table 2: Satisfaction with Main Services:
Comparison: Areas Served by Favela Bairro and Others Not Served by the Program (TULIER, 2011)
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Favela Bairro Factors of Success
In 1988, Brazil included a section on urban policy in their constitution to become the first
country in the world to do so. The section included two articles only: the first one recognized
the function of property and the other article recognized the rights of the land owner. Labor
unions and civil society had a great role to play in the issuance of these articles (Fernandes,
2010).
It is worth mentioning that in the following decades, local governments in Brazil became
independent of the central government making more democratic decisions and were notably
capable to develop and carry out projects addressing the needs of the city. This decentralization
of government together with prioritizing urban equity made the Brazilian cities more like an
incubator for urban improvement (Fiori, 2000).
Besides, Favela Bairro had set explicit principles for the community’s involvement in the
decision making associated with infrastructure interventions (Magalhães, 2012). The program
was elaborately discussed with the community from the beginning. For the sake of mobilizing
the population and mediating in the case of conflicts, local representatives were recruited. At
first, community involvement in decision making of infrastructure upgrading was not formalized.
Thus, special sessions were developed to formalize the process.
In addition, a constructive element of success in Favela Bairro was promoting continuous
training of technical staff. This also led to spreading the needed knowledge to enable replication
of the experience in future programs. It was noted that the commitment to the settlements of this
trained staff increased during program implementation. Even though some of these staff left their
positions in the program due to changes in the government, yet they joined other governmental
agencies in different municipalities to expand the process of knowledge sharing and information
dissemination (TULIER, 2011).

P a g e | 47

As for the level of political and institutional commitment, there was a full municipal
government commitment represented in dedicating a big portion of the budget of Rio de Janeiro
to the Housing Department and granting it a central role. Moreover, Favela Bairro enjoyed
successful intersectoral practices which involved the departments of health, labor, education and
social development as well as public companies such as the State Water and Sewer Company,
the Urban Cleaning Company and Rio de Janeiro’s Municipal Urbanization Company
(Magalhães, 2012).
The experience of Favela Bairro is useful in the sense that the project was not built on a
set institutional structure; it was the outcome of a public housing policy, which in turn
established the Municipal Housing Department that implemented the project. Architects,
engineers, and other professionals who had enough experience in public works in informal
settlements, were hired by the department. This participation of external personnel, chosen based
on merit and qualifications, provided innovative ways to solve problems by integrating different
methods and experiences (Fiori, 2000).
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Nairobi, Kenya
Another good example of slum upgrading is the city of Nairobi in Kenya. Like many
other developing countries, Kenya has witnessed a huge increase in urban population over the
past five decades (Muraguri, 2012). The challenge posed on the government in this respect was
great and they failed to provide essential services of housing, health and education.
Consequently, more urban dwellers in Kenya, especially Nairobi, lived in overcrowded slums
that lack fundamental facilities to maintain a minimum standard of living. In Nairobi, for
instance, the growth of slums was unprecedented; 60 percent of the population, occupied 5
percent only of the total land area and lived in informal settlements (Syrjänen, 2008).
Furthermore, water was not available except for only 22 percent of the slum population in
Nairobi, most of them suffered from the high prices imposed on them by manipulative vendors
(UN-Habitat, 2006). They also suffered from poor and insufficient sanitary services which led to
many health problems and diseases.
The government of Kenya, as a response, implemented several initiatives to address the
issue of slums (UN-Habitat, 2003). They established a number of institutions among which are
the Nairobi Informal Settlements Coordination Committee and the Local Authority Transfer
Fund. These institutions focused on providing improved access to services, settlement upgrading
and community participation. The positive outcomes of these initiatives are basically expanded
community participation and opportunities and an increased housing stock (Syrjänen, 2008)
Since the 1970’s, with the emergence of excessive worldwide concerns with slum
conditions and the call for slum-free cities, the Kenyan government was urged to find solutions
responding to slums prevalence. Over the span of time, the government of Kenya implemented
several housing development policies and strategies, such as resettlement, forced eviction, site
and services development and upgrading (UN-Habitat, 2008). Forced eviction was the prevailing
practice of slum demolition until 2000. When the Millennium Development Goals, which
stressed the necessity of slum upgrading, were adopted by UN member countries, Kenya began
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shifting its approach to slum upgrading. In 2003, the government of Kenya and UN‐HABITAT
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) by which UN‐HABITAT should manage the
Kenya Slum Upgrading Project (KENSUP), starting with Kibera, Nairobi's largest slum. As per a
statement by the government of Kenya, the objective of KENSUP was to “have improved the
livelihoods of at least 5.3 million urban Slum dwellers (1.6 million households) by the year 2020
at an estimated cost of Kshs 884 billion or $13 billion” (Muraguri, 2012). As for funding, the
project received USD 240,000 from Cities Alliance and USD 110,000 from UN-HABITAT. The
project’s contribution partners were the Nairobi City Council, Ministry of Housing, Ministry of
Roads and Public Works, and Ministry of Cooperatives (Muraguri, 2012).
According to the MoU of the project, the role of UN‐HABITAT was to provide technical
guidance through consultants from the UN, provide the needed support in the infrastructure work
and manage a proper utilization of the program’s funds. For example, UN-Habitat worked as a
liaison with donor agencies and worked closely with the government of Kenya to create a Slum
Upgrading Fund to provide low cost housing. The government of Kenya was responsible for
providing training, equipment, supplies and material (UN-Habitat, 2006).
In 2008, the Kenya Vision 2030 was launched outlining the country’s plan for
development until 2030. The key objective of this vision was providing improved access to
affordable housing. (Kenya Vision 2030 , 2007). This was also documented in the new
constitution which was adopted by Kenya to guarantee all citizens the right to adequate housing
and sound standards of sanitation. In order to make this happen, the government worked in
cooperation with some international institutions, particularly the World Bank. Accordingly, loans
were facilitated to start another slum upgrading program—the Kenya Informal Settlement
Improvement Program (KISIP)—parallel to KENSUP and which was developed in 2011
targeting 15 cities including Nairobi. Funds were granted by the World Bank and other
international agencies (Syrjänen, 2008).
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KENSUP and KISIP Content, Scope and Implementation
KISIP had five years plan, from 2011-2016, aiming at providing infrastructure and
securing land tenure in 15 cities, whereas KENSUP had a 20 years plan, 2005-2025, aiming at
providing affordable housing and community participation. The following table shows the main
scope of each program:
PROGRAM
Scope

KISIP

KENSUP

- Five-year project (2011-2016)

- Long-term project (2005-2020)

- Strengthening infrastructure

- Housing/shelter improvement

- Participatory urban planning

- Provision of physical and

- Strengthening main institutions
of urban management

social infrastructure/ amenities
- Community mobilization and participation

Table 3: KISIP and KENSUP Main Scope of Work (Syrjänen, 2008)

KENSUP and KISIP were concurrently implemented by the Ministry of Housing (MoH)
and local authorities. KISIP was managed by the Ministry of Housing that was responsible for
overall program coordination, program design, procurement, financial management, monitoring
and evaluation (M&E), as well as reporting. As for KENSUP, it was managed by the Ministry of
Housing together with the Department of Slum Upgrading established under the supervision of
the Ministry of Housing (Anderson, 2015).
The Slum Upgrading Fund was established by GoK and UN-HABITAT to serve as a pool
for the funding of slum upgrading programs and KENSUP was one of them. UN-HABITAT
provided the initial funding with subsequent financial support from the National Budget. On the
other hand, 60% of KISIP’s funding came from the World Bank, 30% from SIDA and AFD and
10% from the Kenyan government (UN-Habitat, 2006).
Starting 2013, KENSUP focused on Kenya’s four largest cities in terms of population:
Nairobi, Mavoko Mombasa and Kisumu. In Nairobi, the project covered housing, Infrastructure
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and social services; in Mavoko, the project targeted housing and infrastructure; in Mombasa and
Kisumu, the program focused on social services such as schools, markets, and health facilities
(UN-Habitat, 2006). The selection criteria of cities were comprehensive and detailed. It included
a number of considerations such as status of land tenure, location of settlement, size of
settlements, proximity to trunk infrastructure and community willingness to take part (Anderson,
2015).
KENSUP and KISIP Outcomes
The following achievements have been made:
KENSUP

KISIP



Socio‐economic mapping





Master plan for Kibera was developed

been implemented in the 15



Creation of Settlement Executive Committees

cities

Institutional strengthening has

in two villages in Kibera



Land tenure



Construction works for 405 units in Mavoko



Provision of infrastructure



Establishment of schools, clinics, water &
sanitation facilities.
Table 4: KENSUP and KISIP Outcomes

KENSUP and KISIP Factors of Success
Both programs enjoyed actual government support financially and in terms of providing
the needed personnel. On the one hand, KENSUP was legally formalized by establishing a Slum
Development Department under the supervision of the Ministry of Housing. Within the program,
a Slum Upgrading Fund, which dedicated around $13 billion to implement the program, was
created. In addition, KENSUP was financed through funds from the national budget. On the
other hand, the KISIP project also received a loan from the World Bank, amounted to $165
million.
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Another key factor of success was the integration of community participation into the
project policy. Besides, KENSUP used housing cooperatives as a tool for community
mobilization. The Ministry of Cooperative Development and Management formed a number of
cooperatives in both Mavoko and Kibera together with other four housing cooperatives that were
already formed and registered in Soweto, Kibera and five in Mavoko. Facilitation in the
formation of Housing Cooperatives Society and community groups in slums is considered an
achievement in itself. Housing cooperative societies were recognized as the best mechanism for
participation in upgrading projects (Muraguri, 2012).
Another success element is that both programs were established on collaboration.
KENSUP involved the cooperation of GoK and UN-HABITAT while KISIP involved the
collaboration of the World Bank and was executed by GoK (UN-Habitat, 2006). The
collaborative nature of the projects drew upon the expertise of each partner to achieve successful
implementation. Such partnership models are considered examples of how to design institutional
strategies to meet the MDG challenge of providing safe and affordable livelihood specifically to
slum communities.
The key principles of KENSUP were decentralization, democratization, sustainability,
transparency, accountability, empowerment, resource mobilization, secure tenure, expansion,
partnerships and networking.
As for the institutional set-up of the project, the Settlement Executive Committee (SEC)
consisting of slum dwellers. Since the government’s main concern was dissemination of
information and decisions concerning the program, SEC was the main driver of this program.
Other institutional aspects of KENSUP included the: Programme Secretariat (in the Ministry),
Settlement Project Implementation Unit, Project Implementation Unit and the Interagency
Steering Committee (IASC), Local Authorities and UN-HABITAT (Muraguri, 2012).
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Codi, Thailand
Moving to another international experience to set role models in the issue of successful
dealings with slums, the research will present the case of Codi, Thailand. In the 1970s
Thailand’s cities witnessed a huge increase in the population of informal settlements. In the early
1980s, it was estimated that 24% of Bangkok’s population lived in informal settlements
(NADKARNY, 2010). The response of municipal governments in Thailand during the 1970s to
this increase of informal settlements was usually eviction and demolition without guaranteeing
resettlement. In response, a number of civil society and community organizations mobilized to
reject evictions. Accordingly, a program to resettle inhabitants of informal settlements into
apartment housing on the cities suburbs was initiated in the 1980s by the National Housing
Authority (NHA). However, the lack of employment opportunities in such locations caused
many families to return to the informal settlements. In this respect, community organizations
started experimenting participatory models of upgrading which were funded through savings
groups. Such community savings groups were created in the late 1980s and were connected
through networks which had enough information about financing schemes and upgrading
methods. Some of these savings groups were financed by UNICEF through small revolving loan
funds (Boonyabancha, 2005).
Apart from the NHA’s upgrading program, some pilot housing initiatives were
introduced for the poor. This involved “land-sharing” programs, through which residents
received infrastructure and secure tenure. This was when they negotiated sharing the site they
have been occupying with the landowner. In 1992, the government of Thailand established the
Urban Community Development Office (UCDO), to provide the needed support to community
organizations in terms of granting loans for new housing, settlement improvements, and income
generation. In 2000, there was a merge between UCDO and the Rural Development Fund
forming the Community Organizations Development Institute (CODI) for the sake of
implementing upgrading housing programs. In 2003, two new upgrading programs were
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announced by the government aiming at providing secure housing to one million poor
households. The first project was the Baan Mankong (“secure housing”) Program, which
dedicated government funds and soft loans to community organizations of the urban poor that
plan and implement improvements to their lands, houses, environment as well as basic services.
This program has been implemented by CODI. The second project was the Baan Ua Arthorn
(“We care”) Program which was implemented with a different perspective. The National
Housing Authority carried out the designs, implemented the construction works and offered flats
for sale at subsidized prices to the residents who can pay US$ 25 – 37 per month. (165 Cities in
Asia, 2012).
The Baan Mankong project was basically initiated to support the existing low-income
communities and organizations for managing and implementing upgrading processes. This was
in cooperation with local governments, experts, universities and NGOs to survey the low-income
communities in a certain city, plan and implement an upgrading program which in turn would
resolve the land and housing problems in this city within three or four years. Upon the
conclusion of these upgrading plans, CODI directed the infrastructure subsidies and housing
loans to the communities, who carried out the work all by themselves (Boonyabancha, 2005).
The Baan Mankong built upon the capacity of the community to meet their own needs.
No specific formula for upgrading was stipulated by the upgrading program; it was open for all
possible options as per the agreement between the owner of the land, people and other
development organizations. When resettlement was inevitable, alternative locations were
suggested to the communities provided that they should be near their original locations, to reduce
the social and economic costs of resettlement. Communities owned power over all the decisions
of the upgrading project and took accountability, to repay loans. The main objective of the Baan
Mankong program was improving housing and living conditions and providing security of tenure
for poor households, in poor communities in Thailand, within a time frame of five years
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(NADKARNY, 2010). One of the main strong points of this program was imposing the least
possible conditions, to allow poor communities and different stakeholders, in each city, the
maximum freedom to design their upgrading program as per their needs. The whole project was
characterized by flexibility which was shown in using flexible financial management and
allowing communities the required flexibility on the ground, contrasting with the usual
conventional contracting and driven methods (165 Cities in Asia, 2012).
Baan Mankong Content, Scope and Implementation
The first stage of establishing the Baan Mankong Program was identifying the relevant
stakeholders and clarifying the project in detail to ensure that the nature of the finance initiative
is clearly conveyed. The second stage was organizing community meetings so that the
stakeholders start taking ownership of the program and establishing a joint committee for
overseeing the implementation of the program. This committee involved the urban low-income
community, social leaders, local officials, academics and NGOs. The committee worked on
building new co-operation relationships and creating a mechanism to plan and implement
housing development initiatives. Once the committee was established, a city meeting was to be
held with delegates from all communities to disseminate the required information about the
upgrading project and the preparation process (Boonyabancha, 2005).
The process usually started by gathering information on all households, infrastructure
problems, land ownership and housing security through a survey that the committee organized.
Using the technique of surveying people’s needs provided an opportunity for people to gather
and learn about the problems of each other. The gathered information was used to set a
development plan that covered all the slum areas in Thailand. In the meantime, loan groups and
collective community savings were created to run funds within the community and to support
community groups (165 Cities in Asia, 2012).
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Upon the completion of work preparation, pilot projects were selected and determined
according to needs and communities’ willingness to participate. These projects were later on
referred to as “learning centers” for other communities (165 Cities in Asia, 2012).
With the pilot projects successfully completed, they may be replicated as an example to
other groups. Necessary was been taken to involve the homeless and urban low-income families
who did not live in the communities. In this respect, the projects were incorporated into the
housing development process of the city. Such a transition necessitated coordination for
integrating the community-built infrastructure into larger public service networks. During the
process, it was fundamental to create job opportunities for the poor and to learn from the success
factors between the population by exchanging visits with government staff and community
delegates (Boonyabancha, 2005).
As for the financial part of the Baan Mankong Program, the infrastructure subsidy perhousehold had a ceiling of US$625 per family for in situ upgrading, and a ceiling of US$ 1,625
per family for families moving to another place. Once the total subsidy for each community was
calculated, this allowed different groups to discuss, share, plan and budget for implementation.
With the help of CODI, the Program also provided soft loans for building houses or buying land.
In addition, the program facilitated the process of receiving a grant to help in funding the costs of
local management and support the organizational process and networking. Securing land tenure
terms were negotiated on an individual basis to offer a variety of options. Moreover, this was
conducted locally, with minimal involvement of national entities. The emphasis was on
collective, rather than individual land tenure (165 Cities in Asia, 2012).
In 2003, for the sake of exploring different upgrading practices, ten pilot projects were
executed. In the next few lines, four cases will be presented.
The first project was land purchase and was implemented in the city of Charoenchai
Nimitmai which comprised 81 households living on a very small area in Bangkok, surrounded by
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an expressway, railway and a sewerage canal. The residents of this community used to rent their
land for many years. In 1998, they offered to buy the land, after being threatened with eviction.
A cooperative was established and people received a CODI loan to buy it. Most residents
constructed their homes via materials from their existing houses. The people succeeded by
negotiations with different local departments to bring electricity, water provision as well as
building permits. In the meantime, a contractor was appointed for the works which required
heavy equipment, but the residents managed other structure work themselves, hiring paid
individuals as labor to minimize upgrading costs by 30%. Each household costed US$ 6,683 in
average, which included $1,126 for housing, US$500 for infrastructure and the rest for
purchasing the land. In return, each household made housing and land repayments between
US$27 and $50 on a monthly basis (Boonyabancha, 2005).
The second project was launched responding to a harm caused by fire in the city of Bon
Kai, a community of 566 households in central Bangkok, which was exposed to a fire that
demolished 200 houses. Accordingly, the people of Bon Kai used this calamity to establish a
cooperative and bargain for a 30-year land lease subject for renewal. The reconstruction works
were set in three stages in order to avoid displacement of people even for some time. For the
sake of accommodating all households, three-storey row houses of only 24 square meters were
built (NADKARNY, 2010).
In the third program, a number of communities joined together for the sake of upgrading
their houses collectively. In an area called Ramkhamhaeng, two primary upgrading programs
took place carrying out a large upgrading process which included seven communities in the same
neighborhood. The first project was a slum rea which consisted of 124 families, inhabiting a
large space of land. The program entailed creating a cooperative and the people succeeded in
gaining a 30-year lease. In addition, the people worked closely with professionals to create a new
design for their community. As for the second project, it included 34 families residing on a site
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that belonged to the state. Their first plan was to renovate and reconstruct their houses in the
same site, but the costs of filling the land were very expensive. Other groups found the project
useful to their cases and managed to join these two programs. They worked very closely with the
local government and prepared a redevelopment plan which provided secure land and housing
for around 1,000 families in several areas. This redevelopment plan helped in creating new
housing areas connected to markets and parks. Eventually everyone remained in the general area
with long term leases obtained through community cooperatives (UN-Habitat, 2009).
In the fourth project, scattered slum areas were consolidated into a new community
enjoying leases for long-term periods. 124 families that were residing in small slum areas were
relocated to the new settlement, Boon Kook, in the northern city of Uttaradit. This was
accomplished through forming a cooperative to which the municipality agreed to lease a piece of
land for 30 years, with a small annual rent. In addition, the residents initiated daily savings
schemes among themselves, the NHA helped in the infrastructure works and CODI offered
housing loans.
Baan Mankong Factors of Success
Unlike traditional projects, urban poor communities were the main players in this housing
upgrading program. This was evident in the fact that the communities controlled the funding,
managed the projects and implemented the improvements. Moreover, they carried out the work
in most of the construction works and did not hire contractors, which led to minimize the cost to
help in the additional investments people made in their own residences. This allowed the
program to be driven by people’s needs rather than being led by contractors or government. One
of the main success factors was that the program supported only communities that were ready
and keen to take part and implement their own improvement projects and allowed responses.
This flexibility allowed the people to choose how to make use of their allocated infrastructure
subsidy, and select the piece of land for purchasing or rental, etc. In addition, the program did
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not stipulate or instruct any standard outputs, but rather provided flexible funding which allowed
the people to plan, execute and accomplish the upgrading process as per their needs. However
for the sake of accuracy, an architect was present during the process of housing planning. The
projects also led to the enhancement of community development funds, subsidized housing and
community welfare systems. What also helped in the success of this program were the strength
that the community managerial systems developed and the confidence they gained in local
government and other involved actors in the city. The poor people were accepted as legitimate
members and valuable partners of their cities when their own upgrading plans and contributions
were integrated into the city’s larger development plans and strategy.
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Summary of the success factors of the in situ development cases
After demonstrating three global experiences in in situ slum development, below is a
summary of their success factors:
Factors of
Success
Community
Participation

Brazilian Experience
Rio de Janeiro
- Community consultation in
the decision making
concerning infrastructure
interventions.
- Careful discussion with the
community from the
beginning of the program.
- Hiring local representatives
to involve the population and
mediate in case of any
conflicts.
- Workshops were introduced
to structure the process of
decision making.

Budget
Allocation

- Full municipal government
commitment reflected in the
granting funds from the
budget of the city to the
Housing Department and
allowing it to play a central
role.
-Total amount of the project
was US$300 million.
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Kenyan Experience

Thai Experience

- KENSUP used housing
cooperatives as a tool for
community mobilization.
- Housing cooperative societies
were recognized as the best
strategy for participation and
transfer of ownership to the
people in upgrading projects

- Communities controlled
the funding, managed the
projects and implemented
the improvements.
- Communities carried out
the work in most of the
building works all by
themselves, rather than
contractors.

- KISIP and KENSUP enjoyed
actual government support by
providing the needed funds
and personnel.
- Around $13 billion and other
allocations from the national
budget were dedicated for the
full implementation of
KENSUP.
- $165 million was received
from the World Bank for the
implementation of KISIP.

- Baan Mankong received
the following financial
support:
- Annual grants from the
government to subsidize
investments in
infrastructure and
services.
- Payments from
community members
which was facilitated by
economic growth
increasing from 5.9% in
1990 to 6.8% in 2010
which in turn has
increased poor people’s
loan-repayment capacity.
- For the sake of channeling
money quickly and
directly to the community,
and taking into
consideration the fact that
CODI was a separate and
independent public
institution, it could avoid
the limitations of
bureaucracy by applying

Institutional
Set-Up

- No particular institutional
- KENSUP and KISIP were
structure was imposed; the
implemented by the Ministry
Municipal Housing
of Housing (MoH) together
Department was established
with the Ministry of Lands.
to carry out the project.
- KISIP was managed by
- Architects, engineers, and
competent personnel from
other experts from other local
both ministries that were
departments who had the
responsible for overall
required expertise with
program execution starting
public works in informal
from the design to the
settlements, were hired by
monitoring and evaluation
the department. This
reporting.
participation of external
- KENSUP was managed by
personnel, chosen based on
personnel from the Ministry
merit and qualifications,
of Housing and the
provided innovative ways to
Department of Slum
solve problems by integrating
Upgrading established under
different methods and
the supervision of the
experiences.
Ministry of Housing.
- The Slum Upgrading Fund
was established by GoK and
UN-HABITAT to serve as a
pool for the funding of slum
upgrading and KENSUP was
one of them. UN-HABITAT
provided the initial funding
with subsequent financial
support from the National
Budget.
- For KENSUP, the Settlement
Executive Committee (SEC)
was composed of the residents
and the government operated.
- Other institutional aspects of
KENSUP included the:
Programme Secretariat (in the
Ministry), Settlement Project
Implementation Unit, Project
Implementation Unit and the
Interagency Steering
Committee (IASC), Local
Authorities and UNHABITAT.

Decentralization - Local governments became
independent of the central
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- Kenya shifted from a highly
centralized form of

directly to the government
budget instead of having
to address a ministry in
advance.
- Baan Mankong enjoyed an
institutional flexibility by
the implementing agency,
CODI which made it
easier to adopt an
approach seeking pro-poor
development by changing
the relationship between
poor communities and the
State.
- The structure of CODI’s
board sought to
institutionalize
corporations and bring
different interest groups
together. The board
included government
representatives,
community
representatives selected
through a People’s Forum
which included five senior
community leaders from
each region and
functioned as a
Community Advisory
Committee.

- The need for flexible
solutions necessitated that

government. This
decentralization of
government together with
prioritizing urban equity
made the Brazilian cities
more like an incubator for
urban improvement.

governance to a more
decentralized one in
implementing KISIP and
KENSUP.

some Baan Mankong
functions which CODI
used to carry out at the
national level to be
decentralized to regional
offices.
- At the administrative
level, CODI advocated
developing cooperation
between communities and
city governments
as well as secure tenure
for poor communities.
- At the community
level, CODI mobilized the
community through the
Baan Mankong
community taskforce
and empowered
community networks. It
also generated and
strengthened savings
groups, and coordinated
upgrading activities with
academics and planners,
government agencies and
NGOs and community
architects.
- Additionally, the project
had gradually delegated
many of the functions
carried out at the
community-level to the
National Union of LowIncome Housing
Community Organizations
(NULICO).

Table 5: Summary of the International Experiences Success Factors

P a g e | 63

Slum Relocation
Mumbai, India
For the sake of presenting more international experiences on different intervention
approaches other than the in situ development previously presented in the three cases of Brazil,
Kenya and Thailand, the coming lines will present a successful case of relocation in Mumbai, India.
In spite of the fact that most opinions oppose the relocation of poor slum dwellers due to the
negative impacts on their lives, yet this innovative approach implemented in Mumbai, India, proves
that resettlement is not always a failure, especially when adopted wisely and facilitated by
community organizations.
Mumbai has a population of around 12 million residents, half of which lived in informal
settlements (Dickson, 2002). The city’s continuous urban growth was inevitable considering its
geographical location that allowed it to function as hub for global trade. Due to the Mumbai’s
geographical nature and physical limitations, growth of low income settlements was limited and
caused the prevalence of settlements suitable for middle and high classes. Besides, most residents
preferred to live next to locations near railway facilities because of the availability of job
opportunities. Accordingly, illegal settlements were increasingly built around these areas which
turned it to be a complex dilemma for the Indian government to deal with (BURRA, 1999).
Considering the fact that the daily operations of the city depended very heavily on the
railway system, since almost 7.4 million passenger commuted on a daily basis, this encouraged
around 20,000 households to establish their dilapidated huts approximately five meters away from
the railway tracks (Dickson, 2002). This resulted in multiple accident incidents for people crossing
the railway tracks. The government of India together with the Railway System Authority, in return,
enforced instructions for trains not to exceed 15 km speed while passing by populated areas, which
caused delay in the schedule of people commuting to work and reduced the efficiency of Mumbai’s
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railway system. In this respect, a ten meters safety zone on either side of the tracks was created and
required to be free of any violations (Patel, 2002).
Actors
The Mumbai’s governing bodies set a plan to improve the public transportation system of the
city with the help of the municipality of Mumbai and the national government agency of the Indian
Railways. For implementation, a loan was received from the World Bank and consequently the
Mumbai Urban Transport Project (MUTP) was launched (BURRA, 1999). An important player in
this corporation was Mahila Milan (MM), a Community Based Organization (CBO) consisting of
women and slum dwellers whose main concern was forming saving groups and conducting credit
activities. Mahila Milan played a major role in empowering women to perform effective roles in the
society. The organization had around 300,000 families as members all over the country. Another
member of this corporation was The Railway Slum Dwellers Federation (RSDF) which included
households residing along the tracks of the railway in Mumbai. This was in addition to the National
Slum Dwellers Federation (NSDF).
Objective
The main goal of the MUTP was to improve the railway system of the city by laying new
tracks, increasing the number of station platforms as well as reducing overcrowding by increasing
the number of cars in the trains. In order to make this happen, twenty thousand poor residents,
located along the railway tracks, had to be relocated from their current illegal huts.
Implementation
In accordance to the guidelines stipulated by the World Bank, a national housing policy was
issued entailing that the government should avoid forced evictions and take the necessary steps
towards working with the community to evacuate priority sites. Meanwhile, in order to secure the
rights of slum dwellers, the government launched the Slum Redevelopment Scheme. Such scheme
was a positive move towards the State’s willingness to look beyond forced evictions. In this regard,
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all residents had to be resettled before any work was initiated. An area called Kanjur Marg was
selected for temporarily relocating nine hundred families (Patel, 2002). This new site was carefully
selected due to its convenient proximity to the residents’ original houses.
Before the beginning of the relocation process, the community was consulted by members of
the NSDF and MM who visited them for presenting the mission they came for and encouraging a
dialogue for ideas and suggestions. The first stage afterwards began with counting and numbering
the huts. Groups of 50 individuals were formed from the residents to share and validate the collected
data. Charts and displaying materials were also available during the meetings with the
representatives for the sake of clarification. After that, the groups of residents formed 27 housing
cooperatives that were entitled to visit the new site and select the exact areas to move to. In addition,
they determined when and how the relocation should take place. On the specified date, the transition
went smoothly and did not involve any problems (BURRA, 1999). The exact process was repeated
until the relocation of 20,000 people was realized.
The temporary housing of Kanjur Marg was only a transitional period, for 2-3 years only,
until they participate in the designing and construction of their permanent houses, in the same new
location, with the help of NSDF. The project was a bit criticized for providing very small spaces of
12 square meters for each household during the transitional period, yet the residents themselves were
satisfied considering the fact that they were moved from very small and deteriorated houses to more
safe and secure areas with full access to basic facilities (Patel, 2002).
Factors of Success
The issuance of the Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy in 1997 was one of the main
success elements of the project. The policy necessitated that the relocation, if inevitable, should be in
the proximity of the current locations and that security of tenure for residents was to be granted. In
addition, the relocation should improve their living standards. Another fundamental success factor in
this project was community participation from the very beginning of the project. Involving the
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community in every single detail starting from the idea to the complete implementation was behind
the success of the project. Moreover, people moved from their poor shacks voluntarily after being
consulted and involved in the decision making process. The housing cooperatives that were
organized by the community were consulted regarding the space allocated for each family,
participated in purchasing the material and monitoring the work of the contractors and even provided
manpower to help the contractor finalize the work on time. Furthermore, the partnership between the
government and community organizations embodied in the MM and NSDF provided valuable
information on land acquisitions and titles. Thus, the community was empowered to assume
responsibilities which facilitated the process of relocation.
Another major and unique factor in the case of Mumbai was the serious involvement of the
MM women. It was estimated that 80% of the community leaders were actually women who were
constantly concerned with saving for future requirements (Dickson, 2002).
Regarding the issue of providing the needed maintenance and security to the place, the MM
established a Central Committee to assume these roles. The Central Committee carried out a process
of combating pests on a weekly basis to keep the area clean of serious diseases. Additionally, the
Committee hired security guards to keep the place free of crime, yet serious problems were
addressed to the Police Authority.
Overcoming Difficulties
It was expected that the process of relocating 20,000 individuals would involve a number of
problems. For example, after resettling in the permanent housing, people started to complain about
cost of living and lack of job opportunities (Patel, 2002). They explained that before relocating, they
shared access to different amenities such as water and electricity, but after relocating, they had to
pay for these costs individually. In response, the Mahila Milan interfered to lessen the transitional
economic situation by establishing several ration shops which sell different kinds of commodities at
very reduced and subsidized prices. Additionally, Nurseries for the children between two and four
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years were established. They accepted children for free to provide an opportunity for households to
search for a means of living without having to worry about their children. Furthermore, the Mahila
Milan granted loans with easy conditions.
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Chapter Five: Case Study and Field Visit
Osman Housing (Masaken Osman)
In order to further assess the most common practice of the Egyptian government towards
slums, field work was conducted in Osman Housing as a typical case of relocation. The case
study looks into the final outcome of the relocation and not the problems encountered during the
process of relocating slum dwellers, including forceful eviction and demolition of slums, which
took place few years ago. The purpose of the case study is not to evaluate the alternative public
housing project that slum dwellers were moved to. Rather, it focuses on how the various aspects
of livelihood of slum dwellers were affected by moving to this project.
Osman buildings are located within the boundaries of 6th of October City. This housing
project was part of the national housing program “Awla belra’aya" or the housing for those most
in need announced by former President Hosni Mubarak in 2005 which is now home to some of
the slum dwellers who were transferred by Cairo Governorate in 2010. The original purpose
of this housing program was to solve the problem of housing for the poorest segments of society
that cannot support themselves, including the homeless, those households whose house fell and
cannot provide shelter, and so forth. These categories later included providing an alternative
housing to the inhabitants of informal settlements that should to be relocated from their slums
(Tadamun, 2015).
Osman buildings went through several changes since their establishment; they were
originally intended to provide affordable housing for very poor families. At present, the current
inhabitants came from different regions and cities seeking affordable housing. Because of fears
of another disaster, Cairo Governorate began to evacuate people living next to the rockslide from
their homes as well as some living in unsafe areas like Istabl Antar and moved them to the units
established in Osman buildings in 6th of October City (Tadamun, 2015).
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Field Visit
Data Collection
Two field visits were conducted to Osman Buildings. The observations of the site were as
follows. Upon arrival at the place, one can notice the very similar six-storey buildings that differ
only in the façade color, in addition to few scattered shops and cafes. Every group of buildings is
very close to one another and separated by pathways and large space areas. Such large spaces
that should be safe playground places for children in fact turned to be full of sewage water and
garbage. One can also see that residents used other areas for raising chicken. Besides
children hang around and play between piles of garbage and stray dogs without any control. One
can easily get a sense of insecurity due to the emptiness of the surrounding areas and the absence
of distinctive characteristics of the place.

Physical adaptation by the residents to create commercial slots in the area
Photo taken by the author, May 2016

Signs of neglect and garbage accumulation
Photo taken by the author, May 2016
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Semi-structured interviews were conducted with ten families who have been living in the
place from 3-5 years and were willing to share their opinions and volunteer to participate in the
study. The semi-structure qualitative interview consisted of 8 questions (see Appendix). Each
interview was carefully recorded and transcribed. While conducting the interviews, the
respondents gave almost the same answers to the questions. This high extent of agreement
between the answers gave the feeling that sufficient data saturation was achieved.
Findings
During the interviews, the following categories/themes emerged and corresponding codes that
could be used to organize and sort the data were developed:
Location, poor infrastructure and the lack of basic services
The remoteness of Osman Buildings and their isolation from different areas of livelihood
represents a fatal problem to the residents which is very difficult to deal with. Besides, the area
lacks facilities, effective services and employment opportunities. Since the establishment of the
buildings in 2012, there haven’t been any schools or operating medical centers. In spite of the
fact that there is a health unit that was established since 2012, it was not operated until 2015, but
still it is for limited use only, not adequately or fully equipped or prepared for complete
operation.
“The government threw us here in the desert in the middle of nowhere,”
said an old man.

“Many of us who have been relocated from Manshiet Nasser, Ezbet Khairallah,
Dar El Salam and Istabl Anatar did not stay in the area for long as they found
the quality of housing and sometimes the location not convenient for them.
They left the units allocated to them and rented them through subcontractors,”
said a mother in one of the families.
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“We should have never been relocated by the government before having
such services operating,”
said one of Osman Housing residents.

Another resident said, “My son was sick and I had to take him to Kasr ElEini
Hospital as the medical unit is not operating. Doctors are scared of working
here and we want them to know that we will protect them and the whole
medical unit with our lives, we just need them to come and serve our
needs.”

All respondents advised that isolation, remoteness, difficulties of reaching the nearest schools,
jobs, health facilities and staying connected with other communities were major challenges
facing them. Children have serious health problems since access to health services is not easy
due to the absence of transportation and the difficulty to reach the nearest public health unit.
Besides, regular vaccination campaigns do not reach this area.
Absence of public transportation
Adding to the problems, the absence of public transportation is another critical issue to
the residents. The tuk-tuk is the only means of transportation available to residents of the
buildings. Most of the dwellers are very poor and cannot bear the high transport costs to
do the simplest tasks, such as buying food at reasonable prices or go to work or to school or get
medical care.
“I go on foot to the other side of the buildings where the nearest pharmacy is located,
which is very far and scary and if I decide to take the only available transportation
means, tuk-tuk, I have to pay L.E. 3 per ride which is too much and we cannot afford it,”
said an old woman.

Besides, for children in particular, access to the nearest schools is not only costly, but it is
dangerous as well since children have to cross El Wahat El Bahareya highway, which lacks any
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pedestrian safe crossing areas. This causes a serious concern to the people as they witnessed
many tragic accidents that caused the deaths of many children in the area.
Irregular water supply
Another major problem that has a serious impact on the living conditions of the
inhabitants is the irregular water supply as almost daily they are subject to water cuts for several
hours and sometimes for several days. All the interviewees said that the water was cut off for a
whole month during the summer of 2014 which pushed the residents to close El Wahat El
Bahareya road and the police arrested many of these protesters and referred them to public
prosecution. To date, the problem of interrupted water supply still exists.

“We have no regular water supply here, we cannot cook, we cannot take showers,
we have to walk very long distances to the neighborhoods to bring water on a daily basis,”
said a young woman.

Absence of security
Area residents generally feel insecure as a result of the isolation from other
neighborhoods of the area along with the absence of a police station and the negligence of
the authorities to the region which resulted in the prevalence of bullying and violence in the
area. The respondents said that there are a lot of drug dealers and gangs in the area.
Another dimension of the feeling of insecurity is the problem of tenure. This is due to the
fact that the leasing contracts granted by the governorate is only temporary and they are
questioning why they were asked to pay rentals while they should own the property as promised
by the government when they evacuated them from their original houses.
The size of the housing units
All apartments have a unified size of 42 square meters, since it was planned to be
temporary housing for those in need with a view of moving to other more stable housing options.
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The tiny size of the housing unit is very annoying to the residents. They pointed out that
bedrooms are too small for their families. Om Ahmed is an example of a mother to a family
consisting of eight individuals started complaining about the inadequacy of the space to her
family and the fact that they have to endure inappropriate and unhealthy sleeping conditions. She
also mentioned that bathrooms space is very uncomfortable and hinders movement.
“They gave us this very small apartment and we are a family consisting of 8 members.
My husband and I sleep in one room and my six kids scattered all over the place,”
Om Ahmed said.

Limited Job opportunities
The residents of Osman buildings also suffer from the difficulty of getting a job in
order to earn their living. Some of them opened kiosks and small commercial projects in the area
and others look for work in the vicinity factories as laborers, cleaners and security staff in
shopping malls and other professions that do not require specific skills. Those who had a chance
to work complain of very low wages and those who opened a small business complain
about the very limited income they get that does not make ends meet for a living.
“We cannot find jobs, our children cannot find jobs either. Our life and jobs
were in Duwaika, we have nothing here,”
said one of Osman Housing residents.

The area does not include spaces for commercial activities which urged some inhabitants to build
their own stores. This lack of employment opportunities makes the area insufferable for the
already financially-struggling population.
Negative impression towards the area
Residents also complain form the negative impression the people outside the area got
about them. This is due to the existence of some elements of crime and the drug dealers. They
said that this generalized perception about the whole region was not fair and causes much harm
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to them who are already disadvantaged. This leads to further marginalization of the region and its
inhabitants.
“People look at us as if we are criminals because there are some drug dealers
and thugs living among us which has a very negative impact on our lives. There
is no police even to protect us from the real criminals,”
a young girl said.

Discussion and Data Analysis
The interviews conducted with the residents of Osman Housing produced important data
that help better understand their problems and needs after relocation. Although the project of
Osman Buildings was intended to provide a solution by the Egyptian government
to the problems of unsafe areas in Cairo, the region later became a problem in itself. The
construction of housing units did not solve the housing crisis for the slum residents. The
resettlement of residents of unsafe areas perhaps allowed the authorities to wash their hands
of the consequences of another potential disaster like the Duwaika one. The process of relocation
and lack of follow up on the conditions of the population afterwards contributed to worsening the
crisis.
All the interviewed residents feel marginalized and do not have a sense of belonging
neither to the place nor the population as a whole and above all, they do not trust the
government. They are actually convinced that the government is against their wellbeing and
existence through their common solution to get rid of them and move them to remote areas.
The area’s current situation and the daily struggles that the residents have to go through
to get the basic services and even to move from one place to another, as witnessed through the
field visits and interviews, show the deficiency of the current governance process in dealing with
such problems. The fact that Osman Buildings is a poor suburban area which is inconveniently
far from residential and commercial activities on the fringes of 6th of October city has made it
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among the most under-resourced and disadvantaged districts of the city. This also shows the
state’s inability to plan for urban development to offer an alternative to the deteriorated
conditions of slums and informal settlements dwellers. The ineffective planning and decision
making is a continuation of the government negligence strategy that has been adopted for years.
This is shown in the inadequate 42 square meter size of the units decided to be assigned to the
dwellers disregarding the fact that many families consist of more than four persons. Failure of
the government’s ability to care for people’s needs is even shown in the process of allocating the
units to each family. This was clearly exemplified in allocating an apartment on the sixth floor to
an elderly woman instead of giving her an apartment on the ground floor.
The officials of Cairo governorate made the decision to move people from their life
threatening houses to Osman Buildings assuming that the area was fully prepared and equipped
to receive this large number of inhabitants while this was not the reality on the grounds. The
project did not study or anticipate the socio-economic impact of moving the inhabitants from
their own homes where they had sources of livelihood to a completely isolated and remote area
like Osman buildings which lacked and still lacks a lot of amenities and basic services like any
other informal areas discussed earlier in this paper. What is more ironic is that due to the
government’s negligence and lack to services, the area exhibits features of informality that are
very close to the areas from which the inhabitants were transferred. It is worth noting here John
Turner’s very early argument comparing the “supportive shack” and the “oppressive house”. He
demonstrated through field work in Latin America that a supportive shack in a slum provided
means of livelihood; shelter, close location to services and jobs at a minimum cost
(Mehlomakulu, 1999). He believed that such shacks provided admirable support for low-income
population and met their expectations. In terms of cost, Turner argued that shacks could be
constructed according to the resident’s needs; shack residents can build their houses at a
minimum cost less than a modern residence would cost. This is due to cheaper materials and
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cheaper labor costs. In contrast, and as the case study of Osman Housing demonstrated, the
oppressive house offered by the government lacked all the previous elements of livelihood. It is
unsatisfactory as it is not built as per people’s needs; it is usually built as uniform structures. As
shown in the case study, families spend most of their income on rentals and service payments
due to the fact that security of tenure is missing from the project.
In addition and as per the data collected from the interviewees, the process of relocating
the inhabitants from their original homes to Masaken Osman was conducted very quickly and
unprofessionally. The fact that they were given a notice two days only prior to the move, and no
details about the place to which they were going to be relocated was available is reflecting the
deficiency of the government’s approach in handling emergencies. What even caused more harm
is that when they arrived at the place, they were shocked by the fact that they moved to the
middle of nowhere, not in the heart of 6th of October City as promised.
While the government always considers that relocation would have a positive impact on
inhabitants since they are supposed to be relocated in better housing units away from
environmental hazards, yet they ignore their social bonds, access to public and private affordable
transportation and reasonably priced markets to get their needs from. The government focuses
only on the shortcomings of the informal settlement from deteriorated housing conditions and
environmental dangers, etc. and believes that relocation is a solution to such problems.
Nevertheless, and as proven through the case of Osman Housing, this approach fails to
acknowledge the real needs of the community and results in making the poor even poorer.
Instead of improving the living conditions of poor inhabitants, irrational relocation often
increases poverty by ignoring the socio-economic background of the inhabitants.
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The current situation in Osman Buildings is a direct result of an authoritarian governance
structure. The government’s adopted top-down planning approach resulted in utter disregard for
citizens’ right to adequate housing, which includes many socio-economic considerations other
than the housing units only. Although such an approach usually proved failure, the Egyptian
government still insists on implementing it. This led to worsening the inhabitants’ situation
rather than providing solutions for them. This shows that this planning approach relied mainly on
assumptions instead of conducting a thorough understanding of the needs of the targeted
beneficiaries. In order to implement quick solutions for economic or political gains leaves
complex and changing realities ignored and revolves grievances of inhabitants.
Although the ten families interviewed in this research is relatively a small sample to be
representative of all the population impacted by resettlement or eviction, however it is indicative.
It is an indication that some of Egypt’s poorest citizens who are displaced from their informal
residences and from the different sources of social support to which they used to have access
suffer devastating consequences and miss a chance of leading a decent quality of life. Given the
fact that the Egyptian government’s urban policies depend mainly upon eviction and relocation
for addressing the problem of slum areas, citizens of such areas in return will continue to suffer
and urban policies will continue to fail. Instead, a government approach adopting strategies for
upgrading the existing informal areas would offer the possibility of improving housing areas and
at the same time imposing minimum costs and social and physical disruption upon citizens.
Through in situ development or upgrading, a gradual improvement of existing buildings together
with infrastructure are recognized without having to demolish homes, displace residents or
disrupt social networks (Mistroa, 2009). Even complete redevelopment of slums in their location
(demolishing the slums and constructing new housing in the same location) would maintain the
connection of the residents to the place and hence keep their sources of livelihood.
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Chapter Six: Conclusion and Recommendations
Conclusion
This research aimed at studying the efforts of the Egyptian government for addressing the
challenge of slums at the policy and implementation levels. The thesis examined why slums do
not develop or improve in spite of all the efforts to do so. It was found that a large percentage of
the population in Egypt is subject to long-lasting practices of denial of their full rights of
citizenship by government officials, including housing rights. This is clearly shown in the
existence of informal unplanned and unsafe areas. Efforts by the government over the past
several decades concentrated more on trying to eradicate existing slums by removing them rather
than dealing with the original reasons of urban poverty and addressing the socio economic drives
that led to the growth of informal areas. Eighty per cent of the government’s interventions are
basically relocation, without involving the community in the decision making processes of the
resettlement which ultimately results in failure, and twenty per cent of the interventions are
redevelopment, which is also proved to be unsuccessful in terms of sustainability. The adopted
practices should actually be the opposite, i.e. 80% redevelopment of slum areas to be applied in a
participatory manner guaranteeing sustainability and 20% only for relocation, when it is
inevitable. The government should be committed to address the actual needs of the population
based on a thorough understanding, not on the government’s interpretation of what their needs
are.
The problems caused by the existence of informal settlements are not only due to political
reasons; they are also based on lack of design, policy making, communal participation, and
above all sustainability. Developing countries around the world, whose experiences were
presented in this paper, implemented several solutions to face the problems associated with
slums. By presenting and exploring different practices from developing countries and at the same
time focusing on understanding some downfalls of a relocation project in Egypt, it was
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concluded that the government did not reach the expected results. The approach of relocation
should be minimized to the most legitimate cases and when resorted to, residents should be
consulted and involved in the selection of the place to which they would be resettled. Those
places should provide the needed public services and access to affordable transportation and job
opportunities. Therefore, the physical upgrading is only the beginning, school amenities and
teacher coaching are needed to address the lack of basic education, health issues need to be
tackled by providing clinics, hospitals and health education programs and lastly special programs
should be offered to increase income earning opportunities.
The Osman Housing project turned to be a problem in itself; it is an example of the
government’s failure in dealing with the slum problem. The experiences of the interviewed
dwellers and the costs they had to bear and which they pointed out are demonstrating the losses
which irrational policies commonly incur upon the people whom such policies are supposed to
benefit. Based on the interviews, an unusual intervention that faces all the presented obstacles
and reflects the expectations of residents is needed.
Therefore, it is important to carefully understand the elements of failure and try to learn
from them. This, in turn, should ensure the success of the future interventions in the area and in
other areas as well. The case of Osman Housing highlights the paradox between ambitious
development programs that may seem wisely planned and the real outcomes on the grounds.
Overall, and in light of the analysis of the current government’s approaches in dealing
with the problem, the international experiences, field study and interviews with the dwellers of
Osman Housing, productive efforts between the people and government need to be encouraged
through effective collaboration between representatives of different fields. The significance of
the findings is to draw the attention for a potential solution to the issues facing slums through
learning from international experiences which proved that it is more vital to build the capacities
of households and communities before the houses. The Egyptian citizen has got a right and at the
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same time has to play a role. Dealing with slums should never be driven by the fact that it is a
problem and that the government needs to get rid of it; the idea of “slum elimination” is not
ideal, it should be “how to deal with informal settlements”. It is not an urban problem in essence;
it is rather a socio-economic one that has negative consequences on buildings and urban areas. In
addition, the problem of distrust between the government and citizens should be resolved. There
is a huge gap in this respect that can be filled by NGOs and civil society organizations that play
the role of mediation and presenting the different methods of development to the citizens, who
may in many cases, be reluctant to accept such changes.
International practices show that engaging the targeted community and improving their
capacities and awareness is essential for a successful upgrading or resettlement. Project
management should give slum residents the feeling of ownership of the whole project and allow
them to participate in the decision making process. In other words, priorities should be identified
before starting. It is concluded that there is a need to endorse, review and enhance the existing
policies and strategies as well as the current efforts of dealing with slums in Egypt. Egypt is still
far from the global context in dealing with slums and informal areas.

P a g e | 81

Recommendations
The recommendations to the Egyptian government proposed in this section will be
responding to the learned lessons and success factors of the four international experiences
introduced earlier in the thesis. This will also be based on the realities and findings reflected in
the literature review, field work and case study.
Political and institutional support
In general, for any upgrading process or intervention to be strategic and successful, there
are a number of necessary prerequisites that need to be present within any project. As a start, any
government should recognize the existence of slums and that upgrading is a necessary means of
intervention to address the poor living conditions in such places. In light of the four international
cases demonstrated in this thesis; any project should be endorsed by political and institutional
support from the government to all involved partners. It is crucial that the program gets the
political will and obligation of the government and the participating local entities. For
implementation, the role of local authorities is crucial in each phase.
In the case of Rio de Janeiro, for example, political and institutional commitment were
shown in the fact that the Favela Bairro program was exclusively instituted according to a local
government policy decision, and implemented by personnel from the Municipal government.
This atypical institutional set up was possible because in Brazil, municipalities are autonomous
entities which allowed for enough autonomy to design and execute their own public policies
apart from the State (Castro, 2009). Thus, the local government of the city undertook complete
liability for the development and execution of the program. The government commitment was
also represented in allocating a considerable portion of the city’s budget to the Housing
Department and allowing it to play a central role (Magalhães, 2012).
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National strategy for dealing with slums
In light of the above, Egypt needs to provide the necessary political will and institutional
support that can be reflected in setting a national strategy for dealing with slums which, in turn,
necessitates that the government employs strategic actions at the national, local and governorate
levels. Since slum upgrading projects are managed and coordinated at the local level, thus
interventions are necessary not only at the local or program level, but also at the level of local
government as well as at the central government level where policies and legislations are made
and budgets are allocated. The interventions on these levels need to be consistent and
complementary to achieve the best results.
In this respect, supportive institutional reforms are necessary to include a special budget
for slum development within the annual budget of the state. It is also important to encourage
governorates to manage their own slum upgrading funds. Additionally, some legislative reforms
enacting laws that explicitly recognize the rights of slum dwellers are crucial for dealing with
slums in Egypt. Besides, coordinating operations between different stakeholders: ISDF,
governorates, and concerned ministries is needed (Abdelhalim, 2014).
Community participation
Another important step on the part of the Egyptian government is that it should take
necessary actions to encourage community participation as seen in all the four cases of
international experiences. Adopting a participatory process and starting with the people not the
physical improvement as well as establishing a dialogue for negotiating different options and
including dwellers in decision making is essential. In other words, enabling slum dwellers to
actively take part in improving their own conditions should be implemented on the grounds.
Implementing slum development programs should be relying on a people-centered approach
where tools to consult and involve the inhabitants is incorporated throughout the whole process.
In other words, in order for any project to succeed and achieve its intended goals, community
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involvement is essential. In the meantime, existence of professional expertise is necessary, but
must not replace involvement of local communities (Abdelhalim, 2010). Also here comes the
role of the central government to support in identifying slum types and characteristics,
communicating with slum dwellers to win their trust through implementing a participatory
approach, and finally managing and executing slum development projects.
A creative idea such as the housing cooperatives that was applied in the KENSUP
program of Kenya is an effective tool for community mobilization. Egypt may apply such a
technique as a means for involving the people in upgrading programs. This should also entail
raising the awareness of the slum dwellers about the importance of the upgrading process,
through campaigns or workshops, like the ones organized within the Favela Bairro project, to
structure the process of decision making. This is to avoid any reluctance or resistance on the
dwellers part.
Rights based approach
As demonstrated in the four international case studies, slum upgrading should focus on
the needs and aspirations of slum dwellers. It should recognize that residents of such locations
have the same rights as other citizens in formal areas. Therefore, a rights-based approach should
be adopted by the government guaranteeing the following:
 The right to suitable housing which is endorsed by article # 68 in the Egyptian
constitution that agrees with the Millennium Development Goals regarding
improving living conditions of slum dwellers, Goal 7. This is also in accordance
with the new Sustainable Development Goals, Goal # 11, 11.1 stating that “by
2030, ensure access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic
services, and upgrade slums” (Osborn, 2015).
 The right of security of tenure through titling of land and houses. Upgrading in the
sense of providing clean water, adequate sewage disposal and improving the well-
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being of the community is crucial, but what is more fundamental is legalizing or
regularizing the houses that lack security of tenure (Sims, 2008).
 The right to access to public and government services.
 The right to the city in order to avoid displacement of slum dwellers to remote
locations, as seen in the field work and interviews with the dwellers of Osman
Housing, and start applying necessary measures for integrating them into the city’s
society and economy. This social and physical inclusion should be included in any
developing or relocating interventions for slum areas (Abdelhalim, 2014).
Promoting continuous training of technical staff
Moreover, as shown in the case of Brazil, promoting continuous training of technical
staff was a constructive element in the success of the program. Therefore, the Egyptian
government should pay attention to providing adequate training to local government employees
and development professionals involved in slum development projects. This will help in
spreading the needed knowledge to enable replication of any successful program in future
programs.
Planning and financial flexibility
Learning from the CODI experience, flexibility and imposing as few conditions as
possible during implementing the program was a success factor. Thus, it is highly recommended
for the Egyptian government to follow suit and allow low-income residents, organizations and
different stakeholders, the required flexibility to plan for their upgrading program as per their
own needs. This would give urban poor residents the opportunity to take active parts in the
process of finding a solution. Flexibility is also recommended in terms of unconditional financial
management. We should abandon the usual conventional and system-led contracting and supply
driven approaches.
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In light of the CODI experience, any development process should usually start by
gathering information on all households, infrastructure problems, land ownership and housing
security. This may be done through a survey that the government together with other
stakeholders organizes. This would provide people an opportunity to gather the needed
information and learn about the problems of each other and would facilitate developing a plan
covering all the areas in need for immediate intervention.
In addition and in light of the successful Indian experience of relocating some residents in
Mumbai in contrast to the complex situation of Osman Housing, it is crucial that basic public
services such as health, water, and education are provided to make it a more habitable place for
its residents. The provision of public transport services is also essential in order to lessen the
transportation cost which is considered a real burden on the residents. This would increase their
sense of security to get better connected with other areas and would also facilitate their
movement and access to educational and employment opportunities.
Moreover, the government should also seek a different decision-making process to
effectively address the issue. Osman Housing exemplifies how thoughtless and inconsiderate
top-down approaches can lead to disasters. Therefore, a people-centered rights-based approach is
needed. An understanding of all the circumstances of the area should be developed by decision
makers. In order to do that, the advice and cooperation of local NGOs working on the site of any
informal areas should be sought and welcomed. Besides, the cooperation of other actors such as
6th of October City Development Agency as well as local residents themselves to address this
problem is crucial.
Further to the above recommendations based on the learned lessons from the international
experiences, the next few lines will present another set of general recommendations to the
Egyptian government that deal with the framework conditions and prerequisites for adopting the
success factor of international experience:
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Comprehensive and sustainable housing policies to overcome the urban divide and
Promote social integration:
The divide which exists between the poor and non-poor areas needs to be acknowledged
and adequate investment in informal areas should be encouraged to reach an inclusive city where
amenities, services and resources are accessible on a more equitable basis. Inclusiveness policies
and strategies should be based on a clear vision of how economic, social and political equality
can be integrated into the daily lives of the citizens of Egypt. The public transport systems of the
new remote areas should also be enhanced to achieve inclusion into the city (Runkel, 2009).
A feasible and applicable social housing policy is needed to provide a broader variety of
housing options to meet the requirements of the urban poor. Development of sustainable
communities should be the main concern of the new social housing programs. The focus should
never be on the production of houses only; enabling individuals and families to work and earn
money is the actual success benchmark. Besides, regulating the distortions of the housing market
would normally improve access to housing by all income categories (Khalifa, 2011).
Promoting urban planning policies to improve opportunities
Since Cairo is an expanding city which continues to spread outwards, and in order to
avoid further division between spaces, it is highly recommended to avoid uncontrolled and
unplanned urban sprawl. A positive approach to densification should be adopted by the
government to reduce urban sprawl. For instance, the number of underutilized and vacant
housing units should be reduced to the minimum by enacting the necessary policies and action
plans. Proximity of services and facilities together with avoiding zoning would also help reduce
urban disparities (Runkel, 2009).
The increase and prevalence of informal settlements needs to be addressed though more
comprehensive activation of existing legislation and more alternative housing options for the
poor. Moreover, affordable serviced land for the poor should be more available. In this sense,
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there is an urgent need to produce social or low-cost housing and offering loans and credits
accessible to the urban poor as well as the middle class (Nada, 2014).
Good governance to bridge the urban disparity
In order for all citizens to enjoy urban equality, local authorities should work closely with
national government bodies and civil society to implement inclusive policies for land use,
planning, housing, etc. This should be supported by less bureaucratic management and more
positive reforms in favor of the urban poor. Improving monitoring of urban change, controlling
vacant and public land as well as preventing squatting on the part of the government are
fundamental steps towards realizing a slum prevention strategy. Nevertheless, a good governance
approach should not only encourage applying the rule of law to halt potential establishment of
slums, but it should also be responsive to the needs of citizens and allow them to communicate
those needs. Such a change in governance and urban management is much needed and will
eventually lead to a significant development in avoiding slum formation by responding to slum
dwellers’ needs (Tadamun, 2015).
Slum upgrading should involve a number of stakeholders; it entails not only an active
role from the government, but also real participation of the civil society and private sector. Good
governance principles should help these stakeholders to actively interact within the frame of the
slum development strategy. Moreover, good governance should include transparency,
accountability, equity, rule of law, participation, responsiveness and a mechanism for combating
corruption in order to achieve sustainability of slum upgrading programs (Abdelhalim, 2014). It
is important that public service is conducted in a way where relevant information is available and
understandable by the citizens. It is also crucial that officials be accountable for their actions by
following the established rules, regulations and procedures. Rule of law should be applicable to
all governmental processes to guarantee a just and fair state. Responsiveness to people’s

P a g e | 88

demands is also important for good governance to be realized. This also entails effective measure
for combating corruption in public service to avoid misuse of public properties or services.
To sum up, the most significant aspect for success is involvement and commitment by the
government, the community organizations and the residents. Besides, people should seek the
upgrading and understand its value. For implementation, the institutional arrangements should be
executed correctly. In other words, incentives should be granted to different agencies to work
with the poor, necessary coordination and dissemination of information should be recognized
amongst different stakeholders and clearly define the roles of the various agencies (Runkel,
2009).
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Appendix

Interview Questions with the dwellers of Osman Housing:

1- Where have you lived before coming to Osman Housing?
2- How long have you been here?
3- How many members does your family consist of?
4- How were you notified about evicting your houses and the resettlement process?
5- Did the government help you move your stuff from your old houses to Osman Buildings?
6- Did you agree on the eviction and settlement decisions? Were you part of the decision making?
7- What do you feel about the new place? Is it satisfactory to you and your family’s needs in
terms of services and job opportunities?
8- Do you think it was the right decision by the government to relocate you?
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